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ABSTRACT 
Terrorism is a crime committed by individuals with a political or social agenda designed 
to influence a government or its population.  The U.S. government, state and local law 
enforcement agencies have, as a priority, the mission of protecting the homeland from the 
threats of terrorism-domestic or foreign.  However, the U.S. government has not 
effectively defined what constitutes a domestic terrorist with the same processes and 
vigor used to identify international terrorists, gang members, or sex offenders. The lack 
of a workable definition and validation process for identifying a “domestic terrorist” 
places law enforcement and homeland security agencies in a position of having to 
balance the need to protect constitutional rights and the need to protect against the 
nation’s security threats.  To this end, this thesis will identify the problems associated 
with a lack of a comprehensive definition, address the safeguards required in a definition 
to ensure constitutionally protected rights are not impinged, and will offer a working 
definition and designation process 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States has yet to implement an adequate process to validate and designate 
domestic terrorism individuals or groups or to widely track and share information 
concerning those individuals or groups with the greater homeland security community. 
This failure has had a deleterious affect, which has, at times, prompted law enforcement 
to impinge on the First Amendment Rights of U.S. citizens: the right of free speech, the 
free exercise of religion, and the right of assembly. 
This is not to say there are not any government lists that touch on domestic 
terrorism adherents.  In September of 2003, President Bush signed Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6 that directed the United State’s Attorney General to 
establish a process to consolidate the government's approach to terrorist screening and 
provide for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in a screening process. 
This directive led to the so named “Watch List” that is primarily used for affecting 
suspected foreign and domestic terrorists’ travel. A second list, a subset of the Watch 
List, known as the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF), which was 
previously established to track and identify gang members, was to be used to track 
terrorist subjects as well. Until recently, these lists were the only repositories for 
agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to externally publish or 
identify domestic terrorism subjects/suspects, not groups, to the homeland security 
community. On April 21, 2009, domestic terrorist subject Daniel Andreas San Diego was 
placed on the publicly accessible FBI Most Wanted Terrorists list. This marked the first 
time a domestic terrorism subject was placed on a list that could be viewed by the public. 
So where can the public and homeland security agencies go to find a complete list 
of designated domestic terrorists or groups?  The answer is; there are no lists.   
Individual states have developed laws and legislation providing for local law 
enforcement to take action against domestic terrorism activities within their own 
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, not only does this type of investigative and legislative 
diversity lend itself as an inefficient process for connecting the dots in a terrorism 
 xvi
investigation, the collection and retention of intelligence, when U.S. citizens are the 
target, promulgate significant First Amendment legal challenges, which further 
emphasize the need for uniformity throughout the nation. Additionally, although the 
current process has not yet failed catastrophically, homeland security agencies should 
recognize the inherent vulnerabilities in the current environment rather than wait for 
failure.  
In order to address this problem, the United States’ homeland security agencies, 
as a whole, must first acknowledge the significant ambiguity between the defining laws 
and regulations that address domestic terrorism investigations and intelligence collection 
across the nation. Secondly, homeland security agencies should leverage current 
technology combined with state, local, and tribal policies and procedures for the purpose 
of information sharing, collaboration, and full visibility of the domestic terrorism threat.  
Finally, identify a federal agency that will provide the national level leadership and 
guidance necessary to consolidate the nation’s efforts in combating domestic terrorism.   
Within the greater homeland security community, the FBI is perfectly poised to 
take on the challenge of developing a process to validate and designate domestic 
terrorism individuals and groups.  The FBI’s role in identifying, investigating and 
collecting intelligence against a domestic terrorism threat has been defined within 
numerous government presidential directives and legislative actions.   
The mission of the FBI includes the protection and defense of the United States 
against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws 
of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, 
state, and international agencies (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009a). A unique 
component of this mission is the responsibility for identifying and investigating domestic 
terrorism within the United States.  
In this thesis, the author purports that defending the United States from terrorism 
and protecting a citizen’s constitutional rights are not mutually exclusive. To the 
contrary, by properly defining a process for designating domestic terrorism individuals or 
groups and a universal system to share information, homeland security agencies will be 
 xvii
able to avoid the Hobson’s choice currently faced when balancing between protecting 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2007 the National Strategy for Homeland Security was published by the 
Homeland Security Council (White House, 2007). Within the strategy was a strategic 
vision of the threat environment as seen through the eyes of the White House. In this 
strategy, domestic terrorism was noted as an overarching threat and was clearly identified 
in the statement:  
The terrorist threat to the Homeland is not restricted to violent Islamic 
extremist groups. We also confront an ongoing threat posed by domestic 
terrorists based and operating strictly within the United States. Often 
referred to as “single issue” groups, they include white supremacist 
groups, animal rights extremists, and eco-terrorist groups, among others. 
(White House, 2007, p. 10)  
The existence of domestic terrorist groups is not at issue. The real issues are 
twofold: (1) how do law enforcement and homeland security professionals define, 
identify, prevent, and disrupt domestic terrorism adherents, and (2) what are the 
challenges the government may face to fulfill such a mission? This researcher posits the 
federal government does not have adequate policies and procedures to assist law 
enforcement and homeland security professionals in properly defining, identifying, 
preventing, and disrupting acts of domestic terrorism. Additionally, due to the absence of 
these policies, the United States does not have a universally accepted process for defining 
and designating domestic terrorist individuals or groups that should be shared throughout 
the law enforcement and homeland security communities. 
There are current policies and procedures defining and designating foreign 
terrorist organizations (FTOs).1 The legal criteria for designating FTOs and the process to 
follow in doing so are defined within section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
                                                 
1 For a more comprehensive review of the FTO process review the CRS report for Congress titled The 
“FTO List” and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Cronin, 2003), which 




(INA), Title 8 U.S.C. 1189 and are further amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.2 
As such, the Secretary of State maintains the responsibility of designating and publishing 
FTOs on behalf of the United States government. The State Department is not alone in 
this process but is directed to consult with the Intelligence Community and the Attorney 
General prior to completing the designation process (State Department, 2009). There are 
currently 45 FTOs designated by the State Department, but there is no comparative 
domestic terrorist organization (DTO) list. Because there is no DTO list, one should ask, 
why?  
In September of 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6 was 
signed by President Bush, which directed the Attorney General of the United States to 
establish a process to consolidate the government's approach to terrorism screening and 
provide for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in a screening process 
(White House, 2003). The consolidated list is known as the Terrorist Screening Database 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2009, p. 1) but is more often simply referred to as the 
“Watch List.” The list born out of HSPD 6 does not provide for any of the benefits as 
realized by the FTO list by comparison.3 The so named Watch List is primarily used for 
alerting users to the possible encounters of suspected terrorists and for affecting domestic 
and international travel of suspected terrorists (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009). There 
is a second list, which is a subset of the Watch List, and is known as the Violent 
Gang/Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008). It was 
previously used to track/identify members of criminal gangs but is now being used to 
track and identify foreign and domestic terrorists who are under investigation by the FBI 
and other designating agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009, p. ii). 
In 2003, the Congressional Research Service authored a report examining the 
FTO list and the sanctioning of designated FTOs. The report also set out to examine other 
                                                 
2 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Section 41 further defined the role of the Secretary of State in 
designating foreign terrorist organizations.  
3 Specific legal ramifications for being designated as a foreign terrorist organization are outlined for 





terrorist lists emphasizing that the FTO list was “Not the Only U.S. ‘Terrorist List’” 
(Cronin, 2003, p. 3). The lists outlined within the report were; State-Sponsors of 
Terrorism, Specially Designated Terrorists, Specially Designated Global Terrorists, 
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons and Terrorist Exclusion list (Cronin, 
2003).4 As stated in the report, “The FTO list has a unique importance not only because 
of the specific measures undertaken to thwart the activities of designated groups but also 
because of the symbolic, public role it plays as a tool of U.S. counterterrorism policy” 
(Cronin, 2003, p. 5). A review of these lists revealed that none house the identities of 
domestic terrorist individuals or groups.  
Two additional lists of note are the publically available FBI’s Most Wanted 
Terrorist (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.b.) and Domestic Terrorism lists (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, n.d.a.), which are the FBI’s only externally published 
repositories for identifying a domestic terror subject (post-indictment) to law 
enforcement, selected communities of interest, or the public. Both lists provide 
information concerning fugitives who have been criminally charged and are associated 
with either international or domestic terrorism. For instance, FBI fugitive and animal 
rights extremist Daniel Andreas San Diego was recently added to the FBI’s Most Wanted 
Terrorist list (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.b.). Interestingly, these lists do not 
identify known or suspected domestic terror subjects or groups, regardless of their 
criminal history or current threat, unless or until they have been charged with a federal 
crime, which is unlike the criteria used for placement on the FTO list. 
Efforts to develop centralized lists that openly recognize domestic terrorists have 
been attempted in the past. In 2004, the Forty-sixth Legislature for the State of Arizona 
introduced bill SB 1081: Animal and Ecological Terrorism (Arizona State Legislature, 
2004a). The legislation made it unlawful for groups or individuals to engage in animal or 
ecological terrorism, and made it mandatory for an individual who was convicted of the 
crimes enumerated within the bill to be subject to a Terrorist Registration. This list 
                                                 
4 Some of these lists are available via the Internet and may be viewed on the State Department Web 
site located at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/list/# and the Department of Treasury, Foreign Asset Control Web 




would then be subsequently available for public view via an InternetWweb site (Arizona 
State Legislature, 2004b). Although the legislation was passed in the Senate, records 
reflect that in May of 2004, the bill was vetoed by Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano 
(Arizona State Legislature, 2004b)5. Shortly after the bill was vetoed, the Sierra Club of 
Arizona described the governor as an “All Star” for vetoing the “ridiculous animal and 
ecological terrorism bill” (Sierra Club, 2004). Additionally, the Sierra Club stated the 
legislature focused their time on undercutting constitutional rights, reverently referring to 
the vetoed bill (Sierra Club, 2004). If the bill would have been successful, the identities 
of convicted animal and ecological terrorists would have been made public, and law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies would have benefited through increased 
awareness of potential domestic terrorist adherents operating within their domain. 
In the book Transforming U.S. Intelligence, author Jennifer Sims pointed out the 
possible bureaucratic friction in relation to civil liberties and public protection that may 
occur when collecting domestic law enforcement intelligence and sharing it with other 
agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2005, p. 56). It can be argued 
that Sims’ friction is also present within state agencies, as evidenced by the previous 
example. Henry Crumpton (2005), a contributing author to Transforming U.S. 
Intelligence, stated, “…domestic intelligence collection within the United States had to 
abide by the law” (p. 207). But with that said, Arizona’s attempt to create anti-terrorism 
laws fell victim to political/bureaucratic pressures. Crumpton went on to say that 
collection of domestic intelligence can and should “…enable law enforcement officers 
and other intelligence consumers to do their jobs, [i.e.]…intelligence and law 
enforcement can be mutually supportive” (p. 207). Therefore, in this example, it can be 
argued that if sufficient laws do not exist for public protection against domestic terrorists, 
law enforcement and protection of civil liberties will continue to come into conflict.  
Outside of the bureaucratic challenges encountered by elected officials, the 9/11 
Commission Report also recognized the need for the protection of civil liberties while 
protecting the homeland from the threat of terrorism when it stated, “…Americans should 
                                                 




be mindful of threats to vital personal and civil liberties. This balancing is no easy task, 
but we must strive to keep it” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States [9/11 Commission], 2004, p. 394). When it comes to civil liberties, 
defining the differences between domestic terrorists and individuals or groups exercising 
First Amendment protected activities, is a fundamental challenge. The FBI has partially 
defined domestic terrorism as:  
…the unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual 
based and operating entirely within the United States (or its territories) 
without foreign direction, committed against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Freeh, 2001)  
In 2008, United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey published The 
Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey, 2008). The 
guidelines defined domestic terrorism for the purpose of Enterprise Investigations as 
“domestic terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331 (5) involving a violation of federal 
criminal law” (Mukasey, 2008, p. 23). As Nathaniel Stewart (2005) pointed out in his 
published review of the state of Ohio’s common law history of terrorism, referencing 
research by Nicholas J. Perry, there are at least 19 definitions or descriptions of terrorism 
within federal law. During a 2008 audit of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Watchlisting 
Process, it was noted that “ATF officials suggested that there was a lack of clarity, 
consistency, and understanding of the definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts among 
law enforcement agencies” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 18). The context in 
which the term terrorism is refered to may be found in hundreds of other government and 
federal agency documentation as well (Martin, 2006). 
The final challenge in establishing a process to validate and designate domestic 
terrorists is to determine what agency should be responsible for the development of the 
associated protocols and processes. By way of example, the FBI currently has lead 
agency responsibility for investigating terrorism within the statutory jurisdiction of the 
United States (28 C.F.R. 0.85). The FBI’s role in investigating terrorism has been defined 




Directive 46 (NSPD 46), Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15 (HSPD 15) 6 and 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 are three of the most recent government documents 
defining the FBI’s responsibilities with respect to investigating terrorism (9/11 
Commission, 2004). Individual states have also developed laws and legislation that 
provide for local law enforcement to take action against terrorism adherents within their 
area of responsibility (Stewart, 2005).7 White (2006) noted that notwithstanding the 
nature of the criminal actions perpetrated by domestic terrorism adherents, any law 
enforcement or homeland security agency could respond and call it something other than 
domestic terrorism (p. 231).  
In combination with determining who should be developing a process, Sims 
(2005) identified the need for establishing protocols when it comes to domestic 
intelligence collection and information sharing, and stated, “…such protocols which 
would be openly arrived at, could serve as a mechanism for public discussion of the 
modalities for federal intervention in the cause of domestic intelligence, whether by the 
CIA, FBI, the DHS, or Northern Command” (p. 56). Crumpton (2005) also argues that 
law enforcement and intelligence collection are not mutually exclusive (p. 207), while 
White (2006) posits that what is needed when it comes to law enforcement is a clear 
“framework that [explains] their counterterrorist role” (p. 231). Not withstanding, the 
overall collection of domestic intelligence is not limited to federal entities. Information 
sharing and counterterrorism cuts across all disciplines, both federal and non-federal. 
Therefore, it can be argued that established protocols for collecting domestic intelligence 
against potential domestic terrorism adherents will play an essential role in how law 
enforcement and homeland security communities operate while conducting their day-to-
day activities. 
Unlike the FTO list, which addresses international terrorism ( U.S. Department of 
State, 2009), this researcher identified only one validation and designation process, with 
                                                 
6 National Security Presidential Directive 46 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15are 
classified documents and not available to the general public for review. 
7 Stewart’s research reflected Ohio was just one of several states that enacted antiterrorism statutes 




established protocols, by any federal government agency for identifying individuals 
engaged in domestic terrorism for inclusion on a government list. That list is the 
Consolidated Terrorist Watch List housed within the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), 
which is managed by the FBI (Terrorist Screening Center, 2009). The aforementioned 
protocols are outlined in a document that is classified Sensitive Security Information and 
is not available for review by the general public. This researcher was not able to find any 
validation and designation processes or protocols for domestic terrorist groups in support 
of nomination to any government terrorist listing. The TSC has published limited criteria 
for nominating individuals suspected of being domestic terrorists as part of the Watch 
Listing process (Terrorist Screening Center, 2009). It is noteworthy to mention that this 
criterion does not apply to the nomination of domestic terrorist groups. 
The Attorney General’s Guidelines for domestic FBI operations issued by 
Attorney General Mukasey in September of 2008 outlined the criteria for initiating FBI 
investigations with reference to investigating groups believed to be involved in domestic 
terrorism (Mukasey, 2008, p. 23). However, these guidelines do not provide direction on 
how to validate and designate or establish and publish domestic terrorist groups onto any 
law enforcement or homeland security terrorism list. 
To summarize the problem, there is a long history of domestic terrorist activity 
within the United States perpetrated by groups and individuals seeking political and 
social change (Brannan, 2002, p. 6). These individuals and groups include the Black 
Panther Party, Weather Underground, Covenant Sword and the Arm of the Lord, Ku 
Klux Klan, Earth Liberation Front, Animal Liberation Front, and Timothy McVeigh—
perpetrator of the horrific Oklahoma City truck bombing (Brannan, 2002). Despite this 
history, none of these groups or individuals are identified on any government list as a 
domestic terrorist or terrorist organization. Furthermore, without properly defining and 
implementing processes for designating domestic terrorism individuals or groups, law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies will not be able to take pre-emptive action 
afforded by information sharing activities that could enable the avoidance of a Hobson’s 




B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research addresses important and critical questions related to how the United 
States deals with terrorism initiated by those on the domestic front. Specifically, it 
identifies the need for the United States to define a process to validate and designate a 
domestic terrorist or domestic terrorist group. This straight-forward proposal for 
designating citizens and legal residents in an articulate manner forces us to consider and 
explore four additional but related issues: (1) Will domestic terrorism designation aid 
homeland security communities in their respective counterterrorism missions; (2) Will 
constitutional civil liberties and First Amendment protected activities, (i.e., freedom of 
speech, etc.) be in conflict with a designation and validation process; (3) Should a United 
States citizen be “branded” a terrorist much like a gang member or a sex offender; and 
finally, (4) What federal agency should be responsible for developing a designation 
process? 
C. ARGUMENT 
“The prevention of terrorist attacks must be viewed as the paramount priority in 
any national, state, tribal, or local homeland security strategy,” so stated the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in a report meant to inform the next President of 
the United States who took office in January of 2009 (Ruecker, 2008, p. 7). The report 
went on to state the federal government needed to put forth more efforts, “…to improve 
the ability of law enforcement and other public safety and security agencies to identify, 
investigate, and apprehend suspected terrorists before they can strike” ( p. 7).  
This researcher also recognizes the importance of identifying terrorists and 
preventing future attacks. Therefore, this thesis presents two overarching 
recommendations for consideration by the United States homeland security community: 
(1) Establish a nationwide process that will identify, validate, and designate individuals 
or groups involved in domestic terrorism activities; and (2) assign the Federal Bureau of 




The premise behind the designation of domestic terrorists and groups follows the 
same logic as other nationally recognized criminal and international terrorism designation 
processes, which serve “important public safety purposes,” as stated in the National 
Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) Final 
Guidelines of 2008 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 3). Additionally, lists such as 
the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list, “…brings legal clarity to efforts to identify 
and prosecute members of terrorist organizations and those who support them” (Cronin, 
2003, p. 7). Cronin further emphasized the importance of the FTO list in her 
congressional research report of 2003, where she stated, “…the FTO list…provides 
lucidity…of coordinating the actions of Executive agencies, by giving them a central 
focal point upon which the efforts converge. U.S. counterterrorism is therefore potentially 
more effective….And these measures arguably make Americans more secure from 
terrorist attacks” (Cronin, 2003, p. 7). Currently, this researcher has not identified any 
government sponsored domestic terrorism list that provides for the same advantages as 
SORNA or the FTO list.8 Therefore, arguably Americans may be less safe from a purely 
domestic terrorist attack due to the absence of a domestic terrorist list.  
In recognition of the need for the development of a domestic terrorist validation 
and designation process, this researcher posits the FBI as the legitimate agency to take on 
such a challenge. Mintzberg, Ashland & Lampel describe legitimacy as a function of 
three systems: formal authority, established structure, and certified expertise (1998, p. 
240). First and foremost, there are compelling statutory authorities for the FBI to take a 
leadership role in the development of a domestic terrorist list. For example, the FBI’s 
responsibility to investigate terrorism is defined within 28 C.F.R. 0.85 that states, the FBI 
shall, “….Exercise Lead Agency responsibility in investigating all crimes for which it has 
primary or concurrent jurisdiction and that involve terrorist activities or acts in 
                                                 
8 SORNA authorizes the Attorney General thru the use of federal law enforcement to assist in locating 
and apprehending sex offenders who violate registration requirements. Groups who are identified on the 
FTO list are subject to financial and criminal sanctions from numerous federal law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies. Conversely, the domestic terrorists who are placed on the watch lists such as the No-
Fly and VGTOF are not subject to any criminal or regulatory actions. It should be noted the No-Fly list and 




preparation of terrorist activities within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States” (28 
C.F.R. Section 0.85). Additionally, 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85 further states, “if another 
[non-FBI] Federal agency identifies an individual who is engaged in terrorist activities or 
in acts in preparation of terrorist activities, that agency is requested to promptly notify the 
FBI” (p. 2).  
FBI investigations and operations are governed by the Attorney General’s 
Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey, 2008). These guidelines apply to 
domestic investigative activities of the FBI including domestic terrorism investigations. 
The guidelines incorporate oversight measures, “…to ensure that all FBI activities are 
conducted in a manner consistent with law and policy” (Mukasey, 2008, p. 6). 
Additionally, the FBI is currently responsible for the nomination of all purely domestic 
terrorism subjects to the Terrorist Screening Center for watch listing purposes (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2009a, p. vii). The FBI has inculcated the responsibility for 
counterterrorism into its culture and currently lists counterterrorism as its number one 
priority investigative program (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007a). The structure 
and resources devoted to the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division further illustrates the 
emphasis the agency places on counterterrorism operations.9  
Building on statutory obligations and processes already in place, the FBI has been 
“…recognized throughout the world, and they became the only agency that could 
coordinate thousands of local U.S. police departments in a counterterrorism direction” 
(White, 2006, p. 230). Additionally, the FBI’s vision, as explained by the FBI’s National 
Information Sharing Strategy, [is] “…committed to sharing timely, relevant, and 
actionable intelligence to the widest appropriate audience” (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2008).  
In light of the continued threat of future domestic terrorist actions by actors who 
are both known and unknown, a validation and designation process will enable 
                                                 
9 FBI Director Mueller stated in his 2007 testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs that the FBI realigned its priorities and transformed itself into a national 




information-sharing between all agencies thereby fostering an environment for law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies to better understand and prevent attacks by 
domestic terrorists. 
D. VALUE INNOVATION 
The value innovation is to incorporate the law enforcement and homeland security 
communities of interest into a domestic terrorism investigative and intelligence collection 
process. In their book The Blue Ocean Strategy, Kim and Mauborgne (2005) describe 
value innovation as “… instead of focusing on beating the competition, you focus on 
making the competition irrelevant by creating a leap in value for buyers and your 
company, thereby opening up new and uncontested market space” (p. 12). The FBI has 
consistently employed the same strategy when addressing domestic terrorism. This 
strategy has primarily consisted of the FBI identifying and investigating domestic 
terrorism adherents either by relying on referrals from state and local law enforcement 
and other communities of interest or by independently developing intelligence that would 
promulgate an FBI investigation. Unfortunately, as White pointed out, law enforcement 
may label terrorism something else, such as a regular crime, and as such, believes that 
“most domestic terrorism goes unnoticed” (2006, p. 230). Once the domestic terrorism 
investigations begin, the FBI assumes the responsibility to advance the investigations 
(i.e., entering domestic terrorism subjects into VGTOF) (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2009a, p. vi). Unfortunately, the mere existence or results of the investigations of the 
identified domestic terrorism adherents may never be known outside a select group of 
communities of interest.10 Unlike international terrorists groups, criminal gangs, and 
child sex offenders, whose existence are made known through various public and law 
enforcement sensitive lists (e.g., SORNA, FTO, and the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s (LAPD) Gang Injunctions list),11 the FBI has consistently employed a 
                                                 
10 Subjects entered into VGTOF are not published directly to local law enforcement or the National 
Counterterrorism Center unless specific inquires are made by a specific agency.  
11 The Los Angeles Police Department’s Current Gang Injunctions list identifies validated gangs 





domestic terrorism strategy effectively grabbing a larger share of domestic terrorism 
investigations and intelligence collection that may result in a zero-sum game in the fight 
against domestic terrorism adherents. Although the overarching issue is to prevent future 
terrorist attacks, the FBI should define a supporting strategic initiative for the 
development of a process that would incorporate the over 800,000 full time law 
enforcement officers, Intelligence Community members, and homeland security 
employees located throughout the nation (U. S. Department of Justice, 2009b). The 
essence of this premise was also identified within the 9/11 Commission Report: 
The FBI is just a small fraction of the national law enforcement 
community in the United States, a community comprised mainly of state 
and local agencies. The network designed for sharing information, and the 
work of the FBI through local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, should build a 
reciprocal relationship in which state and local agents understand what 
information they are looking for and, in turn, receive some of the 
information being developed about what is happening, or may happen, in 
their communities. In this relationship, the Department of Homeland 
Security also will play an important part. (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 427)  
This thesis supports the argument that the development of a process to validate 
and designate domestic terrorism individuals and groups would complement the nation’s 
counterterrorism strategy. As stated by White (2006), “It would be helpful if law 
enforcement officers had a practical framework that explained their counterterrorist role” 
(p. 231).  
An effective way to display a diagnostic view of the value innovation used in this 
thesis is through the use of a strategy canvas (Figure 1). As Kim & Mauborgne (2005) 
describe, a strategy canvas may be used to identify the current state of an industry and 
also visually represent uncontested market space. In this case, the canvas depicted in 
Figure 1 has identified the current and preferred state of defining domestic terrorism, 
agencies collecting intelligence, civil liberties concerns (perception), published domestic 
terrorist lists, and a validation/designation process. The deficiencies between current and 
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Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas (After Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
The development of a legally defensible validation and designation process for 
domestic terrorism adherents would have a positive shift from the present state, as 
depicted by the circles, to a preferred innovative state, as depicted by the triangles. The 
preferred state would provide for the following: 
1. Defining Domestic Terrorism 
As previously stated, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism 
(Martin, 2006) or domestic terrorism as borne out by the interviews in support of this 
research (Appendix I). This research has identified a useable definition for the purpose of 
validating and designating domestic terrorism adherents, thereby offering more clarity for 




2. Agencies Collecting  
The collection and retention of intelligence, when U.S. citizens are the target, 
promulgate significant constitutional challenges.  As previously mentioned, ATF officials 
suggested there was a lack of clarity, consistency, and understanding of defining terrorist 
acts among law enforcement (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 18).  It can be argued 
these same issues affect the greater Intelligence Community.12 Additionally, due to 
narrow and sometimes unpublished collection requirements pertaining to domestic 
terrorism, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies are unclear on what to 
collect.  Therefore, it may be further argued establishing a clear and concise validation 
and designation process will permit more agencies to begin collection of intelligence 
surrounding domestic terrorism adherents.      
3. Civil Liberties  
The United States government has an obligation to protect civil liberties and the 
constitutional rights of all its citizenry (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 234).  As such, the 
agencies responsible for protecting the citizenry from the threat and actions of terrorists 
are often challenged by differentiating between constitutionally protected civil liberties 
and the potential actions of terrorist(s). Conversely, citizens expect the government to 
operate within the guidelines of the constitution. By openly publishing legally defensible 
validation requirements to define a domestic terrorism adherent, this research suggests 
the ambiguity surrounding impinging on civil liberties by law enforcement will be greatly 
diminished.  This concept is further supported by the resultant interviews conducted in 
support of the research (see Appendix A, question 11).   
                                                 
12 The U.S. Intelligence Community consists of 18 agencies which includes the FBI. Further 





4. Published Domestic Terrorism Lists 
This research has determined there is only one mechanism to publish the identities 
of suspected domestic terrorism adherents (with limited distribution) and no mechanism 
to publish the identities of suspected domestic terrorism groups. Domestic terrorism 
adherents may be identified through the inquiries made to the Consolidated Terrorist 
Watchlist (Terrorist Screening Center, 2009). Post-indictment, a domestic terrorism 
adherent may be identified within the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist list and Wanted 
Domestic Terrorist list (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). There are no government 
published lists of groups who are suspected of sponsoring domestic terrorism or 
individuals convicted of crimes associated with domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism 
validation and designation processes and corresponding lists will provide clarity and a 
better understanding of the domestic terrorism threat to the greater homeland security 
community. 
5. Validation and Designation 
The research has determined there are no universally accepted validation 
requirements defining domestic terrorism adherents. The FBI has an established watch 
list nomination process for their field agents (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a). Outside 
of the FBI’s watch list nomination process, this research did not identify any federal 
domestic terrorism validation protocols to be followed by the greater homeland security 
community. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The benefits of this thesis will have the potential to address several areas critical 
to homeland security to include detecting, disrupting, or preventing another domestic 
terrorism attack. First, establishing a national level domestic terrorism validation and 
designation process will provide for a national effort in standardizing domestic terrorism 
investigations and intelligence collection (Interview of Intelligence Community Official, 




people do not know who are subjects and who are not” (Interview of Biomedical 
Research Advocate, 2009).  This standardization will, in turn, help to alleviate public 
fears of increased loss of civil liberties due to increased domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement actions (Interview of State Law Enforcement Official, 2009). As stated in 
the 9/11 Commission Report, “We must find ways of reconciling security with liberty, 
since the success of one helps protect the other” (9/11 Commission, 2004. p. 395).  
When a crime is labeled with the term terrorism, public fears increase but most 
governments permit security forces greater latitude to address terrorism even though it 
may be a local crime (White, 2006, p. 231). Therefore, developing a domestic terrorism 
validation and designation process will assist law enforcement, homeland security 
professionals, and elected officials in understanding the threats that may be operating in 
their areas of responsibility. In turn, the information may also be used for budget 
enhancements or legislative actions to aid in countering these newly identified threats 
(Interview Department of Justice Law Enforcement, 2009).   
This research has also uncovered that a validation and designation process could 
be a double-edged sword and may not be endorsed by some civil liberty advocates who 
may purport that mere membership in a group does not necessarily imply the member is 
committed to take part in acts of violence (Interview Civil Liberties Advocate, 2009).  
But, to counter this concern, a member of the state law enforcement community stated, a 
“[validation process]…may make it easier to identify members of DT groups. Probably 
not make it any more difficult than it is today” (Interview of State Law Enforcement 
Official, 2009).    
F. METHODS 
The literary research concerning the subject matter of this thesis has yielded 
information that was widely ambiguous (i.e., what is terrorism, who is a terrorist or 






written word. Therefore, in order to obtain the data necessary to better illustrate the issues 
being explored the researcher employed the qualitative research methods of interviews 
and case studies. 
1. Interviews: A Qualitative Approach to Research 
The purpose of the interviews conducted in this research was to assist the 
researcher in identifying qualitative salient points of specificity that were used to 
introduce another perspective in illustrating the usefulness of developing a process for 
validating and designating domestic terrorist individuals and groups. Defining terrorism 
has an element of interpretation that historically has been ambiguous from literary 
research conducted to date.13 Following the suggestions outlined in Leedy and Ormrod’s 
book, Practical Research, Planning and Design, (2005), this researcher believes the 
qualitative method of research employed was the most beneficial means to obtain 
research data to address this quantitative gap. As stated by Leedy and Ormrod: 
Qualitative researchers operate under the assumption that reality is not 
easily divided into discrete, measurable variables. Qualitative researchers 
are often described as being the research instrument because the bulk of 
their data collection is dependent on their personal involvement 
(interviews, observations) in the setting. (2005, p. 96) 
As a federal law enforcement officer with over 20 years of experience 
investigating a myriad of local, state, and federal crimes including acts of terrorism, both 
foreign and domestic, this researcher was able to apply personal knowledge to bring 
additional value-added insights to the research. This experience also assisted in the 
identification and selection of the interview subjects. As suggested by Leedy and 
Ormrod, “Rather than sample a large number of people with the intent of making 
generalizations, qualitative researchers tend to select a few participants who can best shed 
light on the phenomenon under investigation” (2005, p. 96). In keeping with this 
guidance, the interview subjects selected represented individuals the researcher felt could 
provide “typical perspectives and perceptions” (p. 147), which is directly related to the 
                                                 




research. A total of 11 interviews were conducted and included representatives from the 
United States Department of Justice, American Civil Liberties Union, senior officials of a 
statewide law enforcement agency, an advocate for biomedical research, and a law 
enforcement official from the United Kingdom.  
The selection of these individuals was largely based on their historic and current 
involvement in addressing issues surrounding the enforcement of criminal and terrorism 
laws within the United States and abroad. The interview subjects were identified and 
questions were developed relating to the overall argument and issues discussed within 
this thesis. The interviews allowed the researcher to gather a wider range of information 
not readily available in the literature. A total of 23 questions were presented to the 
subjects. By way of example, the questions posed were used to determine: How do the 
interview subjects define terrorism and terrorists? Would a validation process for 
domestic terrorism be a detriment or an added utility to the United States 
Counterterrorism effort? Will a validation and designation process reduce infringement 
on civil liberties? Is the FBI the correct agency to develop a validation and designation 
process?   
Additionally, the interviews allowed the researcher to interact directly with the 
subjects, exploring the responses and “emergent” theories that assisted in explaining the 
topics under study (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 95). All but one of the interviews was 
conducted in person. The final interview was conducted via the internet through a series 
of interactive electronic mail messages. The identities of the interview subjects remain 
anonymous in accordance with the academic policies of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Institution Review Board (IRB) process. The responses of the interview subjects are used 
throughout this thesis and are summarized in Appendix A. 
2. Case Studies: Application and Concepts 
Two case studies were analyzed for the purpose of providing a practical 
application of the arguments and issues presented within the thesis. This researcher 




to which its findings might be “generalizable” to the context of the research (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2005, p. 136). The case study analysis generally followed the five step process 
as described by Leedy and Ormrod referencing the work of J.W. Creswell: organization 
of details, categorization of data, interpretation of single instances, identification of 
patterns, and synthesis and generalizations (p. 136).  
The first case study analyzed the activities of an Animal Rights Extremist Group 
known as Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). SHAC and its members were 
successfully prosecuted in federal court in March 2006 (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2006). The researcher argues throughout the case study that the application of a coherent 
process for validating and designating SHAC and its members as a domestic terrorist 
group, prior to their arrests and convictions, may have identified, disrupted, or prevented 
criminal acts of violence and terrorism.14  
The second case study used a comparative analysis of legal authorities utilized by 
the United States and the United Kingdom for the purpose of collecting intelligence 
against terrorists who are citizens of their respective countries. The collection of 
intelligence against U.S. persons is a significant issue to all citizens as emphasized in the 
Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005 (U.S. Senate, 2005, p. 335). The researcher looks at 
the U.S. person dilemma with regard to the standards required of federal law enforcement 
agencies to collect electronic communications and intelligence against U.S. persons 
suspected of being domestic terrorists as compared to like standards used by the United 
Kingdom. 15 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literary analysis of the critical information pertaining to the subject matter 
provided significant insight into what would be required to develop a process to validate 
and designate domestic terrorist individuals and groups. The research brought to light two 
                                                 
14 The Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) case study is located in Chapter V, Section A. 




fundamental aspects: there is no “universally” accepted definition of a terrorist or 
terrorism (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007, p. iv), and there is no government 
process for validating and designating domestic terrorist groups for inclusion in a 
government list (Robinson, 2006). Recognizing both of these factors are essential steps 
toward developing a legally defensible validation process in support of designating 
domestic terrorism adherents.  
This thesis is in support of the government ultimately defining who is a domestic 
terrorist; therefore, it is important to define terrorism in a manner that would refrain 
from; “…[impinging] unduly on democratic rights and freedoms” (Golder & Williams, 
2004, p. 294). As stated in the Constitution of the United States, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition…” (Constitution, Amendment I). With the protection of civil 
liberties always being of paramont importance, “…most people seem to believe that 
terrorism is bad and should be eradicated” (Bogner, 2007, p. 4). But in order for the 
United States to eradicate terrorism, one must first identify who the terrorists are. Bruce 
Hoffman has written, “…everyone agrees ‘Terrorism’ is a pejorative term” (2006, p. 23). 
With this in mind, to label someone a terrorist infers a “moral judgment” upon them 
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 23). Therefore developing a validation and designation process would 
be of little value if it were at the cost of sacraficing the constitutional rights of our 
citizens.16 
1. Defining Terrorism 
The myriad definitions of what constitutes a terrorist or terrorism is not confined 
to the United States (Martin, 2006). The international community is just as undecided. 
Golder and Williams emphasized this dilemma in a University of New South Wales, 
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discussed the core values of liberty, the rule of law, and principals of fundamental justice and further 
stating “it would be a Pyrrhic victory if terrorism were defeated at the cost of sacrificing our commitment 




Australia, Law Journal article stating, “Some have likened the search for the legal 
definition of terrorism to the quest for the Holy Grail” (2004, p. 270). This research has 
established that social, political, academic, legal, and law enforcement entities from 
several governments have published opinions, enacted legislation, and developed laws for 
the purpose of trying to protect its citizenry from acts of terrorists (Golder & Williams, 
2004).  
Within the United States defining terrorism has met with much the same fate as 
international definitions. In his book, Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman (2006) identifies 
the varying definitions within the U.S. government. He examines the definitions offered 
by the FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. State Department, and the 
Department of Defense (DoD). Hoffman draws reference to Alex Schmid who, according 
to Hoffman, devoted more than a hundred pages of the book Political Terrorism: A 
Research Guide, trying to find a broadly acceptable explication of the word terrorism 
(2006, p. 33). But Hoffman recognizes each agency’s definition is fashioned to reflect the 
priorities of their interests/jurisdictions. For example, the FBI’s definition encompasses 
both social and political aspects (Hoffman, 2006), whereas the DoD definition is more 
complete by including the threat of violence as well as the targeting of whole societies 
but neglects to address social issues (Hoffman, 2006). 
Due to the countless and almost infinite opinions, definitions and debates 
associated with defining terrorism, for the purpose of this research the researcher 
concentrated on how the United States defines what constitutes a terrorist and terrorism. 
Due diligence was made in understanding the composition of these terms within the 
international community as well. Because this thesis is in support of developing a 
designation process that will be applied to domestic terrorists, is there a difference 
between domestic terrorism and an international terrorism? 
a. Domestic and International Terrorism: Why Draw a Distinction? 
The FBI places the terrorist threat facing the United States into the 




FBI Domestic Terrorism Section Chief James Jarboe provided congressional testimony 
describing International and domestic terrorism by stating:  
International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any 
state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or any state…are intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government. These 
acts transcend national boundaries in terms of means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intend to intimidate, or the locale in 
which perpetrators operate… Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or 
threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating 
entirely within the United States (or its territories) without foreign 
direction, committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives. (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2002) 
David Brannan (2002) suggests the distinguishing differences between the 
two types of terrorism are “whether the terrorists who carry out the attack are citizens of 
or residing in the country attacked and whether they are directed from abroad” (p. 4). He 
further argues whether drawing a distinction between the two, “domestic and 
international, are at all helpful or relevant in today’s threat environment” (Brannan, 2002, 
p. 4). Golder and Williams’s research examined how six common law countries defined 
terrorism; Australia, United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, 
and South Africa. An analysis of their research revealed only the United States draws a 
legal distinction between domestic and international terrorism (Golder & Williams, 
2004).  
The internationally based Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) Insurance sub-committee published a report in 2004 that 
attempted to define terrorism for the purpose of compensation. As defined within the 
report, the OECD has a membership of approximately 30 countries who support 
democracy and a market economy. The report attempted to address the historical account 
of terrorism, elements used to help define terrorism, and development of a check-list for 




the 19 countries whose definitions of terrorist’s acts for the purpose of compensation in 
OECD countries, only the United States drew a distinction to terrorist acts “…committed 
by one or more individuals acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest” 
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Insurance Committee 
[OECD], 2004, p. 25). Once again the United States drew a distiction between 
International and domestic terrorism. All other countries, within the report described 
terrorism adherants as organizations or individuals who perpetrated criminal actions upon 
their nation state, regardless of geographic location or citizenship of the perpetrator. In 
this example, the distinction deals with defining the perpetrators so the insured may claim 
compensation after an event has occured. Additionally, according to the report, the 
insurer may use these criteria for setting premiums based on “characteristics of the risks” 
(OECD, 2004, p. 19).  
Within the United States, there are legal and jurisdictional elements to the 
distinction between domestic and international terrorism. According to a Congressional 
Research Report, Elizabeth Martin (2006) brings attention to the hundreds of federal 
statutes and regulations that address terrorism. Within Martin’s report only the more 
prevalent of the statutory definitions were presented, and of these, only one definition, 
Title 18 United Sates Code (U.S.C) 2331, defines both international and domestic 
terrorism. In summary, both definitions have a majority of the same content. The 
differences lay within defining geographic location of the perpetrators. For example, 
within this statute, international terrorism is defined as actions that “…occur primarily 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United Sates, or transcend national boundaries in 
terms of means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to 
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum” 
(Title 18 U.S.C. 2331). It also defines domestic terrorism as actions that “…occur 
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” (Title 18 U.S.C. 2331). 
The FBI utilizes these definitions for the purpose of investigating both international and 




In a report on the proceedings of an international law seminar, Dr. Larissa 
Van den Herik (2007) outlined three important points relating to the definition of 
terrorism: the distinction between domestic and international terrorism, implications of 
qualifying a certain act as an act of terrorism, and the dangers of misusing the term 
terrorism. Van den Herik argues that the “boundaries between these two forms of 
terrorism, [domestic & international], are hard to draw” (p. 3). She further noted that 
although international law recognizes both forms of terrorism it only seeks to regulate 
international terrorism. In other words, international law places the burden of defining 
domestic terrorism on the individual nation.  
It could be argued, as Brannan (2002) suggests, that the United States has 
made the distinction between domestic and international terrorism because policymakers 
do not see the domestic threat to be as dangerous as the international threat. Looking back 
at the purely domestic terrorist activity perpetrated in the 1960s and 1970s, Brannan 
argues “these domestic groups were not taken as seriously as foreign-based groups” (p. 
7).17 But, as previously noted, the United States Code (USC) has made a distinction 
between domestic and international terrorism. Therefore, regardless of the underlying 
political or bureaucratic reasons that may be at play, the United States has established the 
legal parameters for defining domestic terrorism per Title 18 U.S.C. 2331 to be: 
5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that—  
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;  
(B) appear to be intended—  
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or  
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(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and  
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
(Title 18 U.S.C. 2331) 
b. Defining the Act of Terrorism 
A fundamental understanding of the term terrorism was found in the 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, “Terrorism: The intentional use of Violence, 
particularly in order to sow widespread fear, for political ends [emphasis added]” 
(Blackburn, 1996, p. 374). 
The Oxford Dictionary (1996) also brought reference to the French 
Engineer, Georges Sorel, who in the late 1800s and early 1900s attempted to provide 
“reflection” on the violence of his day (p. 375). His belief was what some would consider 
far left liberalism (Blackburn, 1996). He conveyed a message of trying to understand why 
some may use violence against the state due to perceived oppression. Sorel also explained 
the use of violence against those who appear to be sympathizers in order to lure them into 
collaboration with the government they wish to overthrow (Blackburn, 1996). This may 
be one of the earlier explanations of why one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter. 
According to Bruce Hoffman (2006) terrorism is “fundamentally and 
inherently political…. [and] terrorism is thus violence” (p. 2). Ted Gurr “argues terrorism 
is a tactic used by the weak to intimidate the strong and, in turn, used by the strong to 
repress the weak” (White, 2006, p. 228). The United States Code Title 18 U.S.C. 2332b 
(g) specifically defines a federal crime of terrorism as “…an offense that (A) is calculated 
to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to 
retaliate against government conduct…” (Title 18 U.S.C. 2332b (g)). The statute further 
identifies specific violations of federal criminal law such as destruction of aircraft, use of 
biological and chemical weapons, arson, bombing of public facilities, to name a few 




identified within 2332b(g) they may be subject to being defined as perpetrating a crime of 
terrorism. Accordingly, once again federal statute 18 U.S.C. 2331 may be applied in 
support of further defining an act of terrorism. These statutes follow the Oxford definition 
as well as Hoffman (2006) and Gurr’s (White, 2006) arguments in combination that 
terrorism is political, violent, and a tactic. 
The previously mentioned OECD report added historical content to this 
research. According to the report, the League of Nations attempted to define terrorism in 
1937. During this time in history, they looked at terrorism as an attempt, through the use 
of criminal acts, to create terror in the minds of people or groups of people (OECD, 2004, 
p. 10). As time moved forward, this convention was not embraced. The OECD set out to 
establish a checklist that could be used to define terrorism for the purpose of 
compensation. The OECD report identified two main elements that may be applied when 
defining terrorism, “Means and Effect and Intention” (p. 2). According to this report, the 
writers identified these elements through consultation with international member 
countries. Ultimately, understanding that these elements alone could not be used to define 
terrorism, they looked further to identifying what actions may be considered acts of 
terrorism for the purpose of compensation. These acts were defined as those acts causing 
“serious harm” (OECD, 2004, Appendix). According to the report, unfortunately, the 
OECD fell short of completely defining “serious” and left the nation states affected by 
terrorism to decide the meaning themselves. 
As stated previously, the United States Federal Criminal statutes define 
acts of terrorism in two categories, domestic and international; however, according to the 
OECD report, for the purpose of civil compensation, an act of terrorism is only defined as 
acts committed by a foreign person or group. Additionally, the damage caused by the act 
must meet a certain monetary loss threshold before compensation is awarded.  The report 
defines this as follows:   
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002—Public Law 107-279 an act 
certified by the Secretary of the Treasury in concurrence with the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General of the United States; Any 




shall be final and may not be subject to judicial review; Acts or events 
committed in the course of war declared by Congress, or losses resulting 
from acts or events which, in aggregate, do not exceed $5,000,000.00, 
shall not be certified as terrorist acts; Intention of Terrorist act; Part of an 
effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States, or to influence 
policy or affect the conduct of the US by coercion; Committed by one or 
more individuals acting on behalf of any foreign person or group; Means 
used, Violent act or dangerous act; Targets/effects, endanger human life, 
property or infrastructure;. Result in damages within the United States, or 
outside the US in the case of an attack of an air carrier or vessel, or 
premises of a US mission. (OECD, 2004, ANNEX III, p.25) 
Clearly absent from this criteria/definition are the words “domestic 
persons” and further defining the predicate of the violent and dangerous acts. 
Interestingly, this policy places a monetary aspect to the terrorism equation. This 
monetary aspect may be hotly contested if the insured was to suffer significant damage; 
such as what is seen by the victims of low level animal rights/eco-violent extremists or 
homegrown violent Muslim extremists who are operating without foreign direction. 
In the book Thinking Like a Terrorist, author Mike German (2007) defines 
terrorism as; “terrorism = a crime” (p. 34). He came to this conclusion by examining a 
definition by A.P. Schmid of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (German, 
2007). Additionally, as the basis for his argument, German draws on his work as an FBI 
agent investigating domestic terrorists. He actively compares his definition to the portion 
of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) (German, 2007), which defines terrorism 
as: 
...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (28 Code of 
Federal Regulations Section 0.85) 
In German’s opinion, the latter part of the CFR definition goes too far 
because it incorporates a political element, and it is not a legally binding definition in a 
court (2007).  Additionally, he discounts the adherent’s intent/motivation and state of 
mind. According to German (2007), the CFR is used merely for the purpose of giving the 




elements of defining terrorism. German primarily focuses on the acts of violence by a 
terrorist and not necessarily the relevance to the reasons why the acts were done. He 
discounts the political or social agenda of the terrorist and strictly concentrates on the 
overt acts. In his words, “The unlawful use of force and violence against a person or 
property would have been good enough for me” (German, 2007, p. 34).  His emphasis on 
the rule of law is his primary endgame “…using techniques that identify a suspect but do 
not produce admissible evidence against him or her is counter-productive in the long run” 
(German, 2007, p. 149). The strict adherence to the rule of law, when it comes to defining 
a terrorist or act of terrorism, is a new element that German has introduced into the 
terrorism equation. Nevertheless, it can be argued this is a myopic approach for the 
purpose of proactive intelligence collection that will be needed to identify domestic 
terrorism adherents.  
Jonathan White (2006) emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
underlying purpose of a criminal act, “Terrorism has a political meaning beyond the 
immediate crime, even though a terrorist incident may be nothing more than a localized 
crime” ( p. 231).  It could be further argued not all intelligence collected against a 
terrorist or group will be used as evidence in court proceedings; however, this does not 
reduce the value of the intelligence. A group who uses criminal acts in violation of 
federal criminal law for the furtherance of political or social goals may be subject to an 
Enterprise Investigation promulgated by the FBI. According to the 2008 Attorney 
General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (DIOG), an Enterprise Investigation 
may be initiated on a group or organization if there is a reasonable indication that a group 
or organization “may be engaged in” or “in planning or preparation or provision of 
support for:… domestic terrorism” (Mukasey, 2008, p. 23). Following German’s 
argument, he is not interested in the underlying motivations (political or social change) of 








collection of intelligence for the purpose of understanding the threat (i.e., 
motivation/ideology, which could be leveraged later to prevent an act of terrorism) would 
have been of no use to FBI Agent Mike German.18  
Jonathan White (2006) argues, “The factor separating the average criminal 
from the average terrorist is motivation” (p. 234). White cites the work of Brent Smith, 
“according to Smith, terrorists remain criminals, but they are motivated by ideology, 
religion, or a political cause” (2006, p. 234). 
The United States Sentencing Guidelines may further show the importance 
of recognizing motivation when considering the disposition of an individual convicted of 
a federal crime associated with terrorism (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2008).  When it 
comes to applying an enhancement to the sentence of a defendant, the guidelines use 
specific language that states: 
…the offense involved, or was intended to promote, one of the offenses 
specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), but the terrorist 
motive was to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, rather than to 
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, 
or to retaliate against government conduct. In such cases an upward 
departure would be warranted, except that the sentence resulting from 
such a departure may not exceed the top of the guideline range that would 
have resulted if the adjustment under this guideline had been applied. 
(United States Sentencing Commission, 2008, 3A1.4) 
The practical application of this guideline is described by an Assistant 
United States Attorney (AUSA) within the District of Alaska. According to the AUSA:  
…the Sentencing Guidelines offer a terrorism sentencing enhancement if 
convicted of a criminal act specified within the enhancement language. 
For example, if the defendant is convicted of a crime of arson and the 
prosecution can show the defendant did it in support of terrorism, the 
defendant will receive a twelve level enhancement to his sentence even 
though the defendant was not convicted for a terrorism crime. (Assistant 
United States Attorney District of Alaska, personal communication, July, 
2008) 
                                                 
18 Mike German writes, “‘The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property’ would 
have been enough for me. The second half, which discusses the intent driving the terrorist’s use of unlawful 




Susan Tiefenbrun (2003), Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of 
Law, San Diego, California, approached defining terrorism by first “distinguishing 
between three different conceptions of terrorism: terrorism as a crime in itself, terrorism 
as a method to perpetrate other crimes, and terrorism as an act of war” (p. 360). In order 
to further distinguish between the three concepts,  Tiefenbrun identified five basic 
structural elements of the crime of terrorism: 
1. The perpetration of violence by whatever means; 
2. The targeting of innocent civilians; 
3. With the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard for its 
consequences; 
4. For the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating an enemy;  
5. In order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, ideological, or 
religious goal (Tiefenbrun, 2003, p. 362). 
Tiefenbrun does not use the word motive within these structural elements. 
Although, it can be argued motive is embedded in phrases such as with the intent to, 
wanton disregard, purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating and to achieve 
political, military, ethnic, ideological, or religious goal.  
2. A States View of Terrorism 
To place this research in further context, looking at how the United States defines 
a terrorist act, it was important to look at not only federal law, but state law as well. 
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, numerous states, from Alabama to Wyoming, 
enacted anti-terrorism legislation. Nathaniel Stewart (2005) provided an examination of 
the state of Ohio’s progression in defining terrorism and its common law origins. 
Stewart’s work “offers an ‘interpretative tool’ and historical context for courts and 
theorists to employ in those efforts and in assessing any future crimes of terrorism” 
(2005, p. 95). Stewart’s references to federal law are consistent with the previous 
research, which provides that there are numerous definitions or descriptions of terrorism. 




often ignored the social and political nature of terrorism. Stewart identified the definition 
as published within the USA PATRIOT Act brought about similarly inspired state laws 
(2005).  
According to Stewart, Ohio law defines terrorism using words such as, intimidate 
or coerce civilian populations, influence the policy of any government, affect the conduct 
of any government, and influence the policy of any government (2005). Ohio further 
equated terrorism with felony offenses of violence and specifically enumerated these 
offenses to include the disruption of; public services, television, radio, telephone, mass 
communication, law enforcement, firefighting, computer systems, and contaminating 
substances for human consumption with hazardous chemical, biological, or radioactive 
material (Stewart, 2005). Ohio effectively introduces a new element into the terrorism 
definition by adding purpose into the equation. The Ohio terrorism statute consists of the 
following elements: commit one of the specified criminal offenses; do so with the 
purpose to intimidate, coerce, influence, or affect either a civilian population, or 
governmental policy, or conduct (Stewart, 2005, p. 103). Within the rule of law, 
according to Ohio, for the government to prove someone is a terrorist, they must prove to 
the court; the subject committed an act of violence and intended that those acts be for the 
purpose to influence or coerce the government or society (Stewart, 2005). Ohio defines 
purpose as: 
A decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious objective of 
producing a specific result or engaging in a specific conduct. To do and 
act purposely is to do it intentionally. The purpose with which any person 
does any act is known only to himself, unless he expresses it to others or 
indicates it by his conduct. (Stewart, 2005, p. 104) 
The injection of purpose into the equation is what differentiates the acts 
committed during a reign of terror from acts of terrorism. Simply put, one can be 
terrorized, but those acts are not necessarily linked to an act of terrorism as we most often 




3. Designating Domestic Terrorist Groups and Individuals 
Within the United States, there are several Presidential Directives and legislative 
actions that provide for the investigation of terrorism by government agencies. As 
previously mentioned, there are several laws and legislation that provide for law 
enforcement to take action against terrorism activities within its own jurisdictions. In 
September of 2003, President Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 6, which directed the Attorney General of the United States to establish a process 
to consolidate the government’s approach to terrorism screening and provide for the 
appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in a screening process. This directive 
led to the so named “Watch List,” which is primarily used for affecting suspected 
terrorists’ travel. 
Perhaps the most well-known list within the international community dealing with 
terrorism is the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list. The Secretary of State is 
responsible for designating and publishing FTOs on behalf of the United States 
government. The legal criteria for designating FTOs and the process by which to follow 
are defined within section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), (Title 8 
U.S.C. 1101). In 1996, the United States amended section 219 with the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 
This act provides the Secretary of State authority to designate an organization as a 
foreign terrorist organization if three conditions are met: 
1. The organization is foreign. 
2. The organization engages in terrorist activity. 
3. The terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States citizens or 
the national security of the United States. (U.S. State Department, 2010) 
Currently, there are approximately 45 FTOs designated by the State 
Department.19 The State Department is not alone in this process. It is directed to consult 
                                                 
19 The foreign terrorist organization list is continually being updated and may be viewed at the State 




with the Department of Treasury and the Attorney General prior to completing the 
designation process. In December of 2002, Presidential Executive Order 13224 further 
clarified the FTO designation process (White House, 2001). 
A review of a report, authored by the Congressional Research Service, dated 
October 21, 2003, titled The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, identified that there are several lists but the best known is the 
State-Sponsors of Terrorism list (Cronin, 2003, p. 3). As of the writing of this thesis there 
were four countries on this list: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. The validation process for 
designation to this list consisted of the Secretary of State identifying to Congress the 
countries that consistently provided support for acts of terrorism (Cronin, 2003). Being 
designated by this process also provides for other sanctions and laws that penalize 
persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors.20  Listed countries 
may also be subjected to export controls by the U.S. government.   
Additional lists worth mentioning are the Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) 
list and the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list (Cronin, 2003). Later in 
2002, the SDT, SDGT, State Sponsors, and the FTO lists were placed together in an all 
encompassing list named Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list 
(Cronin, 2003). These lists are targeted at blocking terrorist financing and provide for 
economic sanctions by the United States (Cronin, 2003). Additionally, there is a 
Terrorism Exclusion List (TEL) that authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Attorney General, to designate terrorist organizations strictly for immigration 
purposes (Cronin, 2003, p. 4). 
Cronin (2003) indicates the advantage of using the formal FTO designation is the 
list provides legal clarity for law enforcement purposes, and that the list further assists 
decision makers with a focal point for counterterrorism efforts (p. 7). In effect, all 
agencies have an understanding: if someone appears on the list he or she may be subject 
to further scrutiny. 
                                                 
20 The State-Sponsors of Terrorism list is continually being updated and may be viewed at the State 




According to Cronin, “Having a focal point for agency coordination enhances the 
effectiveness of government implementation and may also serve as a deterrent to 
organizations that consider engaging in illegal behavior” (2003, p. 7). It can be argued 
this same logic could apply to domestic terrorism, if the same process were to exist. 
Another advantage of the FTO list is that “…the groups identified on the FTO list are 
stigmatized” (Cronin, 2003, p. 8).  Cronin posits that by publicizing groups that have 
been formally designated, potential donors may be less willing to contribute for fear of 
the legal ramifications (2003).   
As Cronin points out, one of the more notable disadvantages to the FTO list is the 
in-effectiveness of addressing lone actors who may be acting as a want-to-be for the 
benefit of the group they are endorsing, but not yet a member (2003 p. 8). This may be 
representative of the home grown Al’ Qaida inspired threat developing in the United 
States. Another disadvantage is the “inflexibility” of the list.  For example, groups may 
change their names/characteristics quicker than the designation or redress process would 
permit (Cronin, 2003). This particular disadvantage, when it comes to an equivalent 
Domestic Terrorism Organization list, was also an issue of concern noted during an 
interview of a Department of Justice Law Enforcement Official (March, 2009). 
A thorough review of all the lists available at the State Department and Treasury 
Department Web sites revealed that there were no lists identifying domestic terrorists. 21 
4. Criminal Validation Processes 
On the state and local level, several validation processes have been established to 
address gang membership and child sex offenders. For example, the Los Angeles Police 
Department has established a legally defensible validation and designation process for 
identifying local gang members. Once gang members have been validated, criminal 
investigations, and the collection of intelligence in support of the same may be initiated 
against the validated subjects (T. Angeles, personal communication, March 5, 2010). 
                                                 
21 The lists reviewed were located at the State Department Web site located at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/list/#%20dn/ and the Department of Treasury, Foreign Asset Control Web site 




The Los Angeles Police Department also uses a process called gang injunctions 
(Los Angeles Police Department, 2009).  There are currently 37 active injunctions in the 
city of Los Angeles involving 57 gangs (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009).22 The 
purpose of the injunction is to be that of a civil process to declare a gang’s public 
behavior a nuisance (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009). Once declared, special rules 
may be directed toward the gang’s activity. The identity/name of the gang is subsequently 
posted on a public Web-site.  The purpose of the injunction is also to “…address the 
neighborhood’s gang problem before it reaches the level of felony crime activity” (Los 
Angeles Police Department, 2009). Numerous gangs are currently listed, including: 
Toonerville Gang, 18th Street, 42 Street Gangster Crips, Krazy Ass Mexicans, and 
Rolling 60s Neighborhood Crips (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009). 
Another criminal designation process is The Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA), which stems from the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006. This act establishes a set of comprehensive standards for sex offender 
registration within the United States (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008b). The national 
sex offender registry is broken down into two different registries. The first is the National 
Sex Offender Registry (NSOR), which is the responsibility of the FBI to maintain 
through the use of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and the second is the 
Office of Justice Programs’ Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Registry that may 
be viewed on a public Web-site (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008c). Some of these 
registries house the names of, “individuals convicted of criminal offenses against minors, 
convicted of sexually violent offenses, and individuals who are designated as sexually 
violent predators” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008c, p. i). 
5. Civil Liberties 
As stated in the 9/11 Commission Report:  
                                                 
22 The Los Angeles Police Department’s Gang Injunction web site is continually being updated and 




…while protecting the homeland, Americans should be mindful of threats 
vital to personal and civil liberties.  This balancing is no easy task, but we 
must constantly strive to keep it right. This shift of power and authority to 
the government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to 
protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life. (9/11 
Commission, 2004, p. 394)   
The importance of protecting civil liberties was further emphasized in a 2005 
report from Congress to the President whereby, when referring to the roles and 
responsibilities of the United States Intelligence Community, “All intelligence activity 
within the United States—whether conducted by the CIA, FBI, or Department of 
Defense—remains subject to Attorney General guidelines designed to protect civil 
liberties” (United States Senate, 2005, p. 451). Summarizing all issues and 
recommendations in totality, it can be argued that when it comes to monitoring, 
collection of intelligence, and conducting criminal investigations against U. S. persons, 
the protection of civil liberties will always be at the forefront. The U.S. Constitution, 
federal laws, and other civil liberty legislative actions, such as the Privacy Act of 1974 
and Title 5 U.S.C. 552a, Records Maintained on Individuals, afford fundamental 
protection of civil liberties to all persons residing within the U.S. 
The protection of civil liberties goes to the heart of trying to differentiate between 
what is protected speech and that of inciting violence. Stewart suggests that common law 
takes into account these differences by citing Ohio case State v. Loless 1986 (2005). This 
opinion clearly placed boundaries on free speech. In this case, the court offered the 
following opinion: 
The right of free speech is not without limits…While the right of free 
speech entitles citizens to express their ideas, beliefs, and emotions, 
regardless of their popularity, it does not extend to the threatening of 
terror, inciting riots, or verbalizing of false information that induces panic 
in a public place. (Stewart, 2005, p. 105)  
In 2004, Elizabeth Mullen, Christopher Bauman, and Linda Skitka, published a 
study in the Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin. The study, titled Political 




Terrorist Attacks: An Integrated Approach, primarily examined political tolerance in the 
post-9/11 world.  According to their study, a reaction that Americans displayed after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks was the willingness to sacrifice some of their civil liberties 
(Mullen, Stitka, & Bauman, 2004, p. 743).  Mullen et al. further argued as time moved 
forward away from the terrorist event and citizens attempted to return to normalcy, their 
perception of the situation changed, which causing them to become more resilient and 
politically tolerant. As the diversity of the U.S. continues to expand, civil liberties may be 
defined through the eyes of the perceived victims, not necessarily the current laws. When 
it comes to civil liberties, the balance a country strikes will be reflective of the country’s 
core values and societal choices (Boyne, 2009, p. 5). 
6. Summary 
The research conducted to date has established that there is no national or 
international accepted definition for domestic or international terrorism and that there is 
no process to designate domestic terrorist groups by the United States government as a 
whole. The advantages to developing such a domestic terrorism validation and 
designation process could be in keeping with the same advantages as realized by the 
FTO, such as public awareness and a unified focal point for homeland security agencies. 
A possible disadvantage may be the perceived loss of civil liberties. Developing a legally 
defensible validation process may be one of the unique challenges in this process. 
Although further research is required, the precedence in developing a validation and 
designation process for other criminal enterprises, such as criminal gangs and sex 
offenders, may have a direct correlation to a domestic terrorism validation and 









II. DEFINING TERRORISM 
A. RULES OF THE GAME 
The United States government, state, and local agencies have all identified the 
need to protect its citizenry from the perpetrators of terrorism (Stewart, 2005). As the 
research has borne out, German (2007) and the FBI have both stated in part that acts of 
terrorists are nothing more than crimes committed by identifiable criminal elements. The 
FBI, in a report published through the Department of Justice, Terrorism 2002–2005, 
stated: 
In accordance with U.S. counterterrorism policy, the FBI considers 
terrorists to be criminals. …there is no single federal law specifically 
making terrorism a crime. Terrorists are arrested and convicted under 
existing criminal statutes. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005, p. iv) 
But the research also brings forth the significance of what sets terrorism apart 
from the actions of criminal gangs and sex offenders, which as White (2006) emphasized, 
as a political meaning beyond the crime (p. 231). During recent testimony before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, FBI Director Robert Mueller stated: 
Today, we still face threats from al Qaeda. But we must also focus on less 
well-known terrorist groups, as well as homegrown terrorists. We are also 
concerned about the threat of homegrown terrorist…We must also focus 
on extremists who may be living here in the United States, in the very 
communities they intend to attack. (Mueller, 2009) 
It can be further argued criminal actions, regardless of the perpetrator’s 
motivations, will always be of significant consequence to the public.23 But as FBI 
Director Mueller emphasized, it is also necessary to focus on extremism (Mueller, 2009).  
But what is an extremist, and does it imply that if someone is an extremist he is also a 
terrorist? With this seemingly unanswered question, this researcher argues that the effects 
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of the ambiguity of defining what a domestic terrorist is, or is not, has led to countless 
legal and law enforcement challenges. For example, local, state, and federal law 
enforcement officials must attempt to define what constitutes a domestic terrorist based 
on their own legislative or local laws. This has created nationwide discrepancies among 
law enforcement and governing bodies.   
One such example was Arizona’s attempt to use legislation for the purpose of 
developing and defining a terrorist registration process in 2004. The purpose of the 
Arizona legislation was not only to define what animal and ecological terrorism was but 
also to identify the adherents of such terrorism (Arizona State Legislature, 2004).  
Another example of note was illustrated by Minnesota’s Ramsey County Sheriff 
and District Attorney’s offices that leveraged a local law, Conspiracy to Riot in 
Furtherance of Terrorism, during the 2008 Republican National Convention (RNC), 
while investigating and attempting to prosecute the actions of a group called the RNC 
Welcoming Committee (MinnPost.com, 2009; Star Tribune, 2008).  The actions of law 
enforcement and protesters as well as criminal charges brought forward by local 
prosecutors gave rise to heated debate throughout the community at large. Was the RNC 
Welcoming Committee just exercising their First Amendments Rights or were they 
criminals bent on using violence to influence the populous.  After the RNC events, the 
Star Tribune (2009) reported that the terrorism charges against some of the Welcoming 
Committee were dropped, and the county attorney denied that politics played a role in the 
decision.  
Yet, another article drew attention to the use of a Minnesota terrorism law enacted 
in 2002.  In 2008, the St. Paul Pioneer Press published the article “RNC terrorists? Or 
Just Young People Speaking Their Minds?” which drew attention to the ongoing debate 
of trying to collect intelligence and preventing violent actions, all while trying to preserve 
the right of free speech.  Emily Gurnon of the St. Paul Pioneer Press (2008) quoted 
Ramsey County Attorney Susan Gaertner as saying, “This is no way an effort to get at 





In reviewing these examples, it is clear why domestic law enforcement agencies 
find it difficult to define and identify domestic terrorism adherents while trying to collect, 
retain, and disseminate information.  Discrepancies were also clearly evident in 
examining the vast majority of responses provided by the interview subjects of this 
research (Appendix A).  Notably, almost all of the interviewees relied on their own 
agency definition, or personal beliefs, to provide a definition of a terrorist.   
An audit report of the Terrorist Watch List Nomination Process conducted and 
published by the U.S. Department of Justice (2008) further emphasized the ambiguity of 
defining terrorism. According to the report:  
ATF officials suggested that there was a lack of clarity, consistency, and 
understanding of the definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts among law 
enforcement agencies. Therefore, in some circumstances, the ATF is not 
sharing potential domestic terrorism information with the FBI. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008a, p. 18) 
Based on the desire to preempt or prevent future terrorist attacks by domestic 
terrorists, the United States must first define what a domestic terrorist is.  By evaluating 
the information obtained from this research that included interviews, coupled with the 
analysis of academic literature and various federal and state and local laws, this research 
has concluded that a domestic terrorist or group may be defined by the following 
equation: 
Criminal Action24 + Motivation = Domestic Terrorism 
This equation incorporates Mike German’s (German, 2007) opinion of crime = 
terrorism, and the state of Ohio’s definition of purpose, which corresponds to White’s 
assertion of motivation. This equation is also consistent with the OECD report that 
identified two main elements when defining terrorism: means and effect and intention. A 
review of Golder & Williams (2004) reflects most other industrialized countries focus on 
the overt act and motivation (p. 277). 
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For the purpose of developing a legally defensible validation and designation 
process that would ultimately define a domestic terrorism individual or group, the United 
States should use the aforementioned equation in combination with Federal Statue Title 
18 U.S.C. 2331 and 28 C.F.R. 0.85.  
A common problem with investigating domestic terrorism actions are the types of 
criminal activities perpetrated by domestic terrorism offenders. The criminal actions 
committed by domestic terrorism adherents may be “…nothing more than a localized 
crime” (White 2006, p. 231). Usually these actions do not rise to the level of federal 
awareness or involvement.  For example, the actions of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty 
(SHAC) was known for employing tactics or “direct actions” such as vandalism, property 
destruction, equipment sabotage, theft of property, and business and home invasions 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, p. 5).  Often, before these criminal activities come to 
the attention of the FBI, the FBI relies on local jurisdictions to establish the motivations 
of the perpetrators (i.e., are they related to terrorism?). As such, the true motivations of 
some of these activities are not recognized as being associated with domestic terrorism.   
The United States is one of the few countries that further complicates defining 
terrorism by differentiating between domestic and international terrorism. According to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations report Terrorism 2002–2005, 23 out of the 24 
recorded terrorist incidents reported during this period were attributed to domestic 
terrorists (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007b, p. 1).  Title 18 U.S.C. 2331 part (5) clearly 
defines domestic terrorism as activities that: 
(A) Involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;  
(B) Appear to be intended—  
(i) To intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  





(iii) To affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and  
(C) Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
As previously presented, 28 C.F.R. 0.85 defines terrorism as: 
...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (28 Code of 
Federal Regulations Section 0.85) 
Therefore the definitions as defined by Title 18 U.S.C. 2331 part (5) and 28 
C.F.R. 0.85 can be directly applied to defining domestic terrorism by using the 
aforementioned equation:  
Criminal Action25 + Motivation = Domestic Terrorism 
Criminal Action:  Involves acts dangerous to human life or the unlawful use of 
force or violence against persons or property that are a violation of the criminal laws of 
the United States or of any state;  
Motivation: Appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population 
or any segment thereof; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or  
To affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping. Domestic Terrorism: Occurs primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States and not under the direction of a foreign power 
The use of this equation further emphasizes the difference between a terrorist and 
a criminal whose motivations are purely outside the arena of political or social change. 
For example, an individual who creates and detonates an incendiary device for the 
purpose of receiving proceeds from an insurance claim is not a terrorist.  But if that same  
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individual deploys the same incendiary device with the motivation to affect political or 
social change as outlined in Part (5) and the C.F.R., he or she would be defined as a 




III. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
A. LAWS AND POLICIES 
The collection and retention of intelligence, specific to individuals or groups, by 
government organizations has come under constant scrutiny by public officials and civil 
liberty advocates.  As stated in the report of the 9/11 Commission:  
…while protecting our homeland, Americans should be mindful of threats 
to vital personal and civil liberties.  This balancing is no easy task, but we 
must constantly strive to keep it right.  This shift of power and authority to 
the government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to 
protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life. (9/11 
Commission, 2004, p. 394)  
Often, actions taken against individuals by governments are based on evidence 
obtained through various pre-established investigative techniques in accordance with 
specific statutory provisions and legal frameworks.  In August of 2005, the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought attention to an FBI report that was meant to 
inform local, state and federal law enforcement agencies about various groups and 
individuals located in the state of Michigan who were believed to be involved in terrorist 
activities.  The Executive Director of the Michigan ACLU, Kary Moss, went on to say 
through an ACLU press release: 
This document confirms our fears that the federal and state 
counterterrorism officers have turned their attention to groups and 
individuals engaged in peaceful protest activities….Labeling political 
advocacy as ‘terrorist activity’ is a threat to legitimate dissent which has 
never been considered a crime in this country. (American Civil Liberties 
Union, 2005) 
Based on the government’s desire to preempt or prevent future terrorist attacks, 
the United States must strike a balance between the protection of civil liberties and the 
protection of the public.  Alexander Hamilton wrote, “…to be more safe, they [the 




214).  Unlike countries who govern by monarchy or dictatorship, it can be argued 
democracies survive due to the freedoms afforded to their individual citizens.  
Furthermore, it can also be argued that adherence to the rule of law will almost always 
bring legitimacy to a country’s governance in the eyes of its populous, and the world.  
The protection of civil liberties is always at the forefront when conducting 
criminal investigations against United States (U.S.) persons.  The U. S. Constitution, 
Attorney General Guidelines (AGG), and other civil liberty protections, such as the 
Privacy Act of 1974 are some of the overarching boundaries followed while conducting 
criminal investigations by law enforcement and homeland security agencies.  The AGG 
also provides guidance on how the FBI will collect, retain, and disseminate domestic 
terrorism investigative and intelligence information. 
On the federal, state, and local levels several criminal validation processes have 
been established for the purpose of collecting intelligence on U.S. persons who may be 
involved in criminal activity.26  On the federal level, the validation processes are 
specifically defined in legislation or agency policies, and must conform to the Privacy 
Act of 1974 and the U.S. Constitution.  State and local agencies that collect and retain 
intelligence, within their information systems, must conform to the standards described in 
28 CFR, Part 23, “Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies” (28 CFR, Part 23).  
Failure to do so may result in the loss of federal funding from specified programs.  
Therefore, contributing agencies may retain intelligence under the following provisions: 
(3) Criminal Intelligence Information means data which has been 
evaluated to determine that it: (i) is relevant to the identification of and the 
criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is 
reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity, and (ii) meets 
criminal intelligence system submission criteria. (28 CFR Part 23) 
In March of 2005, a congressional report was issued by the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) (United States Senate, 2005).  The report focused on the pre-war judgments 
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made by the U.S. Intelligence Community concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction.  The report also recognized and identified pitfalls of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community.  One of these pitfalls centered on the legal issues surrounding the collection 
of intelligence against U.S. persons.  The report states:  
Throughout our work we came across Intelligence Community leaders, 
operators, and analysts who claimed that they couldn’t do their jobs 
because of ‘legal issues.’ These ‘legal issues’ arose in a variety of 
contexts, ranging from the Intelligence Community’s dealings with U.S. 
persons to the legality of certain covert actions...quite often the cited legal 
impediments ended up being either myths that overcautious lawyers had 
never debunked or policy choices swathed in pseudo-legal justifications.  
Needless to say, such confusion about what the law actually requires can 
seriously hinder the Intelligence Community’s ability to be proactive and 
innovative. (United States Senate, 2005)   
The report also recommended the Director of National Intelligence to establish an 
internal office within their office of General Counsel to take a “…forward-leaning look at 
legal issues that affect the Intelligence Community as a whole,” (United States Senate, 
2005, p. 335).  The research conducted to date determined the issues surrounding 
collection of intelligence against U.S. persons is still highly debated within the 
Intelligence and legal communities.  
B. DEFINING CIVIL LIBERTIES: A PERCEPTION ISSUE NOT 
NECESSARILY A LEGAL ONE 
Based on the international community’s desire to preempt or prevent future 
terrorist attacks, the U.S. and other democratic countries must strike a balance between 
the protection of civil liberties and protecting the public.  Unlike countries that govern by 
monarchy or dictatorship, democracies survive due to the freedoms afforded to their 
individual citizens. 
When it comes to the monitoring, collection of intelligence, and conducting of 
criminal investigations against U. S. persons, the protection of civil liberties is always at 




federal law, and other civil liberty legislative actions, such as the Privacy Act of 1974, 
afford fundamental protection of civil liberties to all U.S. persons. 
A reaction that American citizens displayed after the September 11 terrorist 
attacks was the willingness to sacrifice some of their civil liberties (Mullen et al., 2004, p. 
743).  But, as time passed these same citizens attempted a return to normalcy, but their 
perception of the situation had changed, causing them to become more resilient and 
politically tolerant (Mullen et al., 2004).  It can be argued as the diversity of the U.S. 
continues to expand, civil liberties may be defined through the eyes of the perceived 
victims, and not necessarily the current laws.  When it comes to civil liberties, the 
balance a country strikes will be reflective of the country’s core values and societal 
choices (Boyne, 2009, p. 5).  Therefore, while developing a domestic terrorism validation 
and designation process, it will not only be important to adhere to the rule of law but also 
to take into account how the public will view this process.  In a report issued in 2009 by 
the University of Maryland, researchers found that, “…criminal justice interventions in 
response to terrorism and political violence are often unsuccessful and can even be 
counterproductive” (2009, p. 16).    
Further understanding of how a population defines civil liberties and terrorism 
may lend some insight as to how a domestic terrorism validation and designation process 
should be developed.  How politically tolerant will the public be to a domestic terrorism 
validation and designation process regardless if developed within the boundaries of the 
constitution?  As such, the following areas were explored for the purpose of this research: 
resilience, tolerance, laws, and diversity. 
1. Resilience and Tolerance  
Resilience may be a phenomena defined within the context of recovery from a 
traumatic event such as terrorism.  As Butler, Morland, and Leskin noted, “resilience can 
connote features of an initial reaction to a traumatic event and characteristics of the 
recovery path associated with achieving a return to baseline functions” (Butler, Morland 




described as symbolic immortality. The research conducted by Mullen et al. (2004) 
examined political tolerance within the context of psychological closure after the 
September 11 attacks.  The researchers posit symbolic immortality as a perceived end 
state.  Victims may use a summation of value criteria and standards to cope with a 
terrorism event and lead the victims to the end state. These criteria and standards may 
include bolstering their cultural world view, derogating or aggressing against those who 
do not share it, increased levels of prejudice, and value affirmation (Mullen et al., 2004, 
p. 746). 
As noted by Butler et al. (2007, p. 405), the individual begins to recover from the 
effects of a terrorism event and his or her resilience to the possibility of how he or she 
may handle another like event may evolve as well.  Butler et al. argues that a resilient 
personality may rely on past stressful experiences and successful adaptation to be able to 
increase the ability to master future challenges (2007).  Mullen et al. hypothesis is that 
“…closure [that] facilitates political tolerance is consistent with the observation that 
support for civil liberties does tend to recover over time (Huddy et al. [Khatib & 
Capelos], 2002) and provides one account for what leads to recovery” (Mullen et al., 
2004, p. 746).  Therefore, it could be argued the level of political tolerance displayed by a 
populous may be reflective of the overall recovery process post a terrorism event as the 
populous, in turn, becomes more resilient.  
2. Civil Liberties and the Law 
Civil liberties may be defined as inalienable human rights afforded to all 
regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, or political party. Within the U.S., most of these 
rights such as freedoms of association, speech, and religion, the rights to own property 
and due process are codified within the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights—either 
explicitly or implicitly.  The laws and legislative actions born from these overarching 
documents have been established to protect the citizenry from potential government 




In the wake of the September 11 attacks, law enforcement saw a significant 
increase in unsolicited cooperation from U.S. citizens.  Although no laws were passed to 
undo the freedoms afforded all citizens under the U.S. Constitution, there was a 
significant decrease in political tolerance, as represented in Mullen et al.’s research. The 
research revealed further: 
Huddy et al. (2002) analyzed a cross-section of national opinion polls and 
found that more people were willing to sacrifice civil liberties to fight 
terrorism in the aftermath of Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 (49%) and 
following the 2001 terrorist attacks (68%) than in 1997 (29%), when 
perceived threat of a terrorist attack was comparatively low. (2004, p. 743)   
With a wide demographic sample of 550 respondents, Mullen et al. found that 
eight percent thought the Bush Administration had gone too far, 71 percent about right, 
and 21 percent felt the administration had not gone far enough in restricting civil liberties 
to fight terrorism (2004, p. 750).  A primary example of the decrease in political tolerance 
was evidenced by the quick passage of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act in October of 2001.  
Since that time, some civil liberty advocates have claimed the act removed too many civil 
liberties; however, at the time of passage, the act received widespread, bi-partisan 
support.   
Reflective of this same time period, immediately after September 11 terrorist 
attacks, there was a considerable increase in prejudice and discrimination against groups 
perceived to be associated with the attacks such as Muslim and Arab Americans (Skitka, 
Saunders, Morgan & Wisneski, 2001).  According to statistics compiled and illustrated in 
the book The Impact of 9/11 and the New Legal Landscape: The Day that Changed 
Everything, hate crimes against Muslims far surpassed those of other minority groups 
such as Jews and Blacks (Morgan, 2009).  This discrimination was not by the government 
but rather by other citizens; “Fear and perceived threat lead people to express higher 
degrees of ethnocentrism, to respond more punitively toward out groups, and become less 
politically tolerant” (Mullen et al., 2004, p. 744). A 2009 program report issued by the 





time of higher levels of hate crimes, “…the waves of backlash hate crimes directed 
against Arab-Americans following 9/11 and again after the initiation of the war in 
Iraq…” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009b). 
3. Diversity and Civil Liberties 
As the face of America becomes more and more diverse, defining what a civil 
liberty is may become more diverse as well. As Mullen et al. (2004) discovered during 
their research, after a terrorism event the victims displayed a sense that a moral breach 
had been violated.  Within this context, the value protection model, “… predicts that they 
will respond with aversive arousal (anger and fear), which in turn prompts moral outrage, 
reaffirmation of commitments to core moral values, or both” (Mullen et al., 2004, p. 745).  
Mullen et al. further identified this behavior may be focused on “out” groups, which are 
often individuals with the same nationality or religion as the perpetrators of the terrorism 
event and may be perceived as not having the same core moral standards and values as 
the victims.  This phenomenon was evidenced previously by the increase in hate crimes 
reported against Arab and Muslim Americans following the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. Additionally, the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) 
reported numerous cases of Muslim and Arab passengers being removed from airplanes 
due to concerns of perceived ethnicities.  The ADC termed these actions as illegal (Skitka 
et al., 2009).  During this time, the Arab and Muslim communities were viewed as out 
groups.  Consequently, it could be argued the Arab and Muslim communities felt their 
civil liberties were being violated when the rest of America did not. There were no laws 
or legislative actions taken by the government to single out Arab or Muslim Americans.  
This was a clear dichotomy of Americans being challenged by one group’s perception of 
events and actions.  
4. Summary 
A population that has been victimized by a terrorism event will display various 
levels of resiliency and tolerance in order to cope with the present and future.  During 




between ethnic and cultural norms and legal boundaries.  Although no laws have been 
written to undo the fundamental rights held within the U.S. Constitution and Bill of 
Rights, victims of a terrorist event become resilient to the views of out groups and less 
politically tolerant. Individuals of the Arab and Muslim communities fell victim to these 
phenomena.  This phenomenon was also identified during the 2008 Republican 
Convention when anarchists took to the streets of Minneapolis.  Numerous people were 
arrested for criminal activities and some, but not all, were labeled as terrorists 
(MinnPost.com, 2009; Star Tribune 2008). 
As future attacks loom in the minds of citizens and government officials, civil 
liberties may continue to be defined not just by legal terms, but by how resilient and 
tolerant the population has become.  Therefore, the development of a domestic terrorism 
validation and designation process should focus on the rule of law and not current public 
perceptions or political tolerance. 
C. THE U.S. PERSON DILEMMA: INTERCEPTING A TERRORIST’S 
COMMUNICATIONS, UNITED KINGDOM V.S. UNITED STATES 
Today’s U.S. Intelligence Community is facing new challenges imposed by the 
Information Age.  To stay ahead of state and non-state actors who wish to “wreak havoc 
on U.S. interests” (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008, p. 1), law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies must identify the legal limits that may inhibit these agencies from staying ahead 
of the adherents of terrorism.  One such limitation, as identified by this research, is the 
dichotomy that exists in the manner and method the U.S. uses to intercept oral and 
electronic communications of U.S. domestic terrorists as compared to international 
terrorists.   
In a supporting chapter for the book Intelligence and National Security, Thomas 
Bruneau states, “Much of the good material on intelligence and democracy pertains to the 
established democracies, such as Great Britain, France, and the United States …” 
(Johnson & Wirtz, 2008, p. 516).  Additionally, Bruneau also states, “Intelligence is 




comprehensive legal framework” (p. 518).  This research has established that within the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the U.S., a succession of legal and legislative frameworks and 
provisions have circumscribed certain investigative methods that may be used by police 
and intelligence agencies to collect evidence against suspected terrorists.  Types of 
evidence may include the interception of private electronic and oral communications.  
With the understanding that like the U.S., the UK also seeks to protect civil 
liberties and protect its citizenry from terrorism, this case study will examine two specific 
legal and statutory frameworks within the following areas: defining terrorism and 
interception of communications.  More specifically, this research demonstrates that U.S. 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies cannot always use the same tools to 
investigate suspected terrorists and often succumb to legal barriers when the suspected 
terrorist is a U.S. person.    
1. Legal Frameworks 
During the twentieth century, the UK has faced the threats and effects of 
terrorism. From the violence related to the political status of Northern Ireland to its 
response to the attacks of September 11, the UK has enacted counterterrorism legislation 
to address the adherents of terrorism (Donohue, 2007).  Its ability to balance the safety 
and security of its citizens while preserving civil liberties is under constant scrutiny.  As 
noted by Lord Falconer of Thoroton QC during a House of Lords debate in March 2003, 
“Our society is based on the liberty of the individual...It should not be limited unless a 
proper case for limitation is established” (Donohue, 2007, p .39).  
Efforts by the UK to impose the rule of law over its populous in response to the 
threats and actions of terrorists can be traced back to the early years of the 1900s.  The 
Defense of Realm Act and the Restoration of Orders in Ireland Act of 1920 provided 
legislative guidance to civil authorities to close premises, roads, transportation routes, and 
detain and intern individuals in an effort to protect its citizenry from the threats and 
actions of paramilitary violence (Donohue, 2007, p. 19).  Since that time, the UK has 




and modern day Islamic fundamentalists.  United Kingdom police and intelligence 
agencies have successfully used intercepted communications to prevent and deter 
terrorism both within and outside their borders (P. Smith, personal communication, 
February 25, 2009).   
The UK does not stand alone in the fight against terrorism. Throughout its history, 
the U.S. has endured numerous acts of terrorism inside and outside its borders.  The 
perpetrators of these attacks have included both U.S. citizens, such as Timothy McVeigh, 
and foreign nationals, such as Ramsey Yosef; the acts themselves aimed at both domestic 
targets and U.S. foreign interests.  During recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert Mueller, stated:  
Today, we still face threats from al Qaeda. But we must also focus on less 
well-known terrorist groups, as well as homegrown terrorists.  We must 
also focus on extremists who may be living here in the United States, in 
the very communities they intend to attack. (2009)  
It is axiomatic that terrorists have no geographical boundaries. 
Although the UK does not have a Constitution, or Bill of Rights, it currently 
adheres to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Donohue, 2007).  As 
noted by Lord Falconer of Thoroton QC, during a House of Lords debate in March 2003: 
Any limitations on individual freedom must be proportionate to the threat; 
they must be sanctioned by law and cannot take place on an ad hoc basis; 
and they must be implemented in a way which ensures that there are 
safeguards and that the activities of the executive are subject to 
monitoring, scrutiny and accountability. (Donohue, 2007, p 39) 
An examination of both the ECHR and the U.S. Constitution reveals that both 
define fundamental human rights and expectations of freedoms.  Both documents 
recognize and bestow certain inalienable rights to its citizenry, such as the freedoms of 
religion and speech, and the right to due process.  However, the ECHR and the 
Constitution differ on the legal limits placed on the government to contravene these rights 
while attempting to maintain order or protect its citizenry from danger.  The U.S. 




requires probable cause be shown before a warrant can be issued.  These standards, as 
realized by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ pose significant challenges 
when trying to apply oral and electronic information gathering techniques such as utilized 
by our UK counterparts. 
2. Defining Terrorism: The UK 
As previously noted, there is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism.  
Not unlike the U.S., the UK defined terrorism through a legislative process with the 
passage of the Terrorism Act 2000.  The UK legislation defined terrorism in Section I of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 as, in summary form; the use of threat designed to influence the 
government or intimidate the public and used for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause.  The act further states, acts of terrorism involve serious 
violence against a person or serious damage to property, endangering of a person’s life, 
and creation of a serious risk to health or safety to the public.  According to the act, the 
effects of an action of terrorism include: action outside the UK, reference to any person 
or property wherever situated, and against the government of the UK or of a country 
other than the UK (Terrorism Act 2000).   
Multiple subsequent U.K. legislative acts further defined terrorism offenses and 
the investigative and intelligence gathering techniques that may be used to thwart terrorist 
activities both within and outside the UK.  These acts include the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 and Terrorism Act 2006, but substantively, the definition of terrorism 
was unchanged. 
3. Defining Terrorism: The U.S. 
The U.S. has defined terrorism in the Code of Federal Regulations as: “…the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).  This definition is used solely in the context 




responsible for investigating terrorist activity not for the purposes of legal proceedings 
against terrorists.  In the wake of September 11, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act of 2001 
became law (9/11 Commission, 2004).  The PATRIOT Act further defined terrorism and 
provided two distinct categories: international and domestic terrorism (9/11 Commission, 
2004).  These definitions were codified in Title 18 United States Code 2331.  The Code 
defines international terrorism as, in summary:  
…activity that involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life and 
that are a violation of criminal laws of the U.S. or of any State; are 
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy 
of a government, and that occur primarily outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the U.S. or transcend national boundaries in terms by which 
they are accomplished.27   
The Code defines domestic terrorism with essentially all of the same overt and 
intended actions, except that these actions or activities “occur primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States” (Title 18 United States Code 2331). 
Although both the UK and U.S. definitions contain fundamentally the same 
understanding of what constitutes terrorist activity, noticeably absent from the UK’s 
definition is a distinction between international and domestic terrorism.  Additionally, 
provisions in U.S. law further emphasize the difference between domestic and 
international terrorism particularly when it comes to the electronic interception of 
terrorist communications, which will be discussed later.  The UK’s definition of terrorism 
looks at the actions and targets involved rather than concentrating on the location of the 
perpetrators. 
These overarching definitions of terrorism establish the legal framework utilized 
by the courts, the police, and intelligence agencies within the UK and U.S.  In addressing 
and investigating suspected terrorists, as stated by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, in March 
2007, while conducting an independent review of UK terrorism legislation, “The 
definition is of real practical importance.  It triggers many powers, as well as contributing 
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to the description of offences” (2007, p. 6).  In addition to examining the root definition 
of terrorism, Lord Carlile examined the legislative provisions that provide the 
investigative techniques and oversight utilized to combat terrorism.  He concluded the 
provisions were proportional and necessary:  
The ordinary criminal law does not offer the range of options necessary to 
deal with the need for prophylaxis and pre-emption…I conclude that a 
definition of terrorism is required to describe and circumscribe the 
circumstances in which the special provisions may be used.  (Carlile, 
2007, p. 28)   
Lord Carlile further noted his believes that terrorism is a type of crime, not unlike 
drug dealing or bank robbery, and that unique investigative and intelligence gathering 
techniques should be utilized to address the threat and commission of terrorist acts.  
The U.S. also identifies terrorism as a crime. A report published by the FBI 
through the Department of Justice, Terrorism 2002–2005 stated, “In accordance with 
U.S. counterterrorism policy, the FBI considers terrorists to be criminals. …there is no 
single federal law specifically making terrorism a crime. Terrorists are arrested and 
convicted under existing criminal statutes” (2007b, p. iv). 
Thus, the question becomes, if both the UK and the U.S. fundamentally agree on 
the definition of terrorism and both countries deem the adherents of terrorism as 
criminals, why should the U.S. draw a distinction between domestic and international 
terrorism?  This researcher argues the difference with the UK may lie in the laws and 
techniques employed within the U.S. to investigate and gather intelligence against U.S. 
citizens in contrast to non-U.S. citizens perpetrating or supporting terrorism.  In light of 
Director Mueller’s identification of the transnational nature of terrorism and the 
continuous threat of home-grown terrorism, does the distinction between a domestic and 
international terrorist place the U.S. at a disadvantage?  In a contributing article to the 
MIPT Terrorism Annual 2002, Dr. Brannan [consistency with source intro]argued, “…to 
the utility of the terms “domestic” and “international,” one must wonder whether the 
terms and mind-set they foster are impeding the government’s efforts to protect citizens 




this researcher argues that the U.S. law enforcement and intelligence communities do not 
have the necessary legal tools to surreptitiously intercept the private communications of 
domestic terrorists.  In support of this argument, an examination of the legal authorities 
employed by the UK and U.S. to intercept communications of terrorists will assist in 
determining if vulnerabilities exist in the U.S. legal, law enforcement and intelligence 
frameworks. 
4. Interception of Communications: UK 
The UK police and intelligence agencies derive their authority to intercept private 
telecommunications between individuals from Section 5 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  In summary, the Secretary of State may issue a warrant 
to intercept the (subjects) transmissions by means of postal or telecommunications, if the 
Secretary of State believes it is in the interest of national security, preventing or detecting 
serious crime, or for safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK (Regulation of 
Investigative Powers Act 2000).   
An examination of this provision reveals no distinction made between UK 
citizens and non-UK citizens for the purpose of collecting evidence or intelligence, nor is 
there a distinction made as to whether the crime is one of domestic or international 
terrorism.  The evidentiary standard required by the UK Secretary of State prior to 
issuing an interception warrant is not clearly defined.  Information provided on the UK 
Security Service (MI5) Web site defined the warrant process and standard as follows, “A 
warrant can be issued only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that it meets the tests of 
necessity and proportionality” (Security Service (MI5), 2009, p. 1).  Additionally, a 
former practitioner of a UK intelligence service opined the standard of “reasonable 
suspicion that someone could be a terrorist…is sufficient predication to open a Security 
Service File on a suspect and begin an investigation. Once the file is open it is easier in 
the UK than the U.S.A. to get FISA coverage on suspicion…Does not have to prove the 
target is a terrorist to justify the wire tap” (P. Smith, personal communication, February 




Unlike the UK, U.S. police and intelligence agencies derive their interception 
authority from two legislative measures, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
(Title 50 Chapter 36) and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, (Title 18 U.S.C. 2510-2522).28   
5. Interception of Communications: United States 
The Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United States Attorneys 
published the findings of a U.S. court, comparing the differences between Title III 
authorities and FISA (Department of Justice, 2004).  A summary of the comparisons find:  
Under Title III, the court must find ‘on the basis of the facts submitted by 
the applicant …there is probable cause for the belief that an individual is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense 
enumerated in section 251629 of this chapter.’ In contrast, FISA requires 
the court to find, ‘on the basis of the facts … there is probable cause to 
believe that ***the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power: Provided, That no United States person 
may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely 
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. (50 U.S.C. 1805 (a)(3)) The terms 
‘foreign power’ and ‘agent of foreign power’ are defined by FISA in ways 
that sometimes, but not always, require a showing of criminal conduct. 
(Department of Justice, 2003, p. 5) 
Additionally, under FISA the term “foreign power” may be defined by meeting 
one of six criteria (Department of Justice, 2003, p. 5).  All six criteria require a 
demonstration of a nexus to command or control by a foreign nation or government or a 
group engaged in international terrorism. The term “agent of a foreign power” is defined 
as, “any person other than a United States person…” (Department of Justice, 2003, p. 7). 
“A U. S. person can be an “agent of a foreign power” only if he engages is some level of  
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criminal activity… [this] includes persons engaged in espionage and clandestine 
intelligence activities… sabotage  international terrorism” (Department of Justice, 2003, 
p. 9). 
To be an “agent of a foreign power” under the rubric of sabotage/international 
terrorism, a U.S. person must “knowingly engage” in “sabotage or international 
terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefore, for or on behalf of a foreign 
power….These are criminal law standards…this standard requires the Government to 
establish probable cause…” (Department of Justice, 2003, p. 11). 
Under FISA:  
A U.S. person who is engaged in ‘clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities’ or ‘other clandestine intelligence activities’ for or on behalf of a 
foreign power may be an agent of that foreign power only if those 
activities either ‘involve,’ ‘may involve,’ or ‘are about to involve’ a 
’violation of the criminal statutes of the United States.  By setting a ‘may 
involve’ standard, Congress intended to require less than the showing of 
probable cause applicable in ordinary criminal cases. (Department of 
Justice, 2003, p. 10) 
The report goes on to make a final comparison by stating, “… groups engaged in 
terrorism of a purely domestic nature…should be subject to surveillance under Title III, 
not FISA.  Thus, in its probable cause provisions, FISA is more demanding than Title III 
when applied to U.S. person terrorists” (Department of Justice, 2003, p. 17). 
By examining the U.S. legal authorities to intercept terrorist communications, it 
becomes evident there are limitations and additional burdens of proof placed on police 
and intelligence agencies when the target is a U.S. citizen.  The criminal and intelligence 
collection criteria under Title III and FISA are not consistent tools to be used when trying 
to identify, disrupt, or prevent actions of a domestic terrorist.  In summary, if a domestic 
terrorist is a U.S. person and is in the clandestine intelligence gathering stage, has not 
committed or is about to commit a specific crime as outlined in 18 U.S.C. 2516, neither 
Title III nor FISA may be used.  Director Mueller, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 




Our objective is to defeat national security and criminal threats by 
operating as a single intelligence-led operation, with no dividing line 
between our criminal and counterterrorism programs. We want to make 
sure nothing falls through the cracks. (Mueller, 2009) 
This statement coincides with comments made by Lord Carlile when he identified 
the differences between terrorism related crime and ordinary serious crime.  He stated: 
Fanatics and others moved by fervent ideology or similar purpose are less 
predictable than professional criminals. They are patient so long as they 
have a confident sense of security. They are intent upon and have the 
means to cause terror among a wide and unpredictable section of the 
community. They are driven by a common purpose though not always a 
common goal. They are difficult to find… (Carlile, 2007, p. 24). 
6. Summary 
Both FBI Director Mueller and Lord Carlile have identified the unique and 
clandestine nature of terrorist activities and the need of government to preempt terrorist 
actions in order to protect their citizenry.  The U.S. has created a legal and investigative 
dichotomy by creating two distinct types of terrorists: U.S. citizen versus non-U.S. 
citizen; operating on behalf of a foreign power, or not an agent of a foreign power; 
clandestine intelligence gathering, or just a criminal.  Consequently, the legal authorities 
used to intercept the communications of these distinct types of terrorists may be Director 
Muller’s proverbial “crack.”  The history of the U.S. demonstrates that a domestic 
terrorist may engage in acts do not rise to the necessary level of “probable cause to 
commit a crime” prior to the actual onset of the terrorist attack.  Recent examples include 
Eric Rudolph, the Olympic Park Bomber; Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber; and the 
infamous Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh.  None of the preparatory actions of 
these individuals would have risen to the level required by the interception standards as 
outlined within T III (18 U.S.C. 2516) or FISA, prior to their initial acts of violence. 
Although these individuals are accredited with some of the worst terrorist acts in U.S. 





communications of domestic terrorists has not changed as it relates to U.S. citizens.  The 
threshold of “probable cause” may be too high to effectively accommodate U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.  
Conversely, the UK’s understanding of terrorism is not defined by geographical 
borders or the individuals committing the terrorist acts.  Therefore, its legal framework 
and statutory provisions are not constrained by the location or the citizenship of the 
perpetrator. United States police and intelligence agencies should be provided the same 
investigative latitude and granted the ability to intercept the communications of any 
terrorist regardless of their location or citizenship. If terrorism is a unique type of crime, 
as Lord Carlile and the FBI have previously noted, and the precursors to committing a 
terrorist act are distinctive, the U.S. must establish new laws or authorities to effectively 
combat terrorism. 
This research has established that the U.S. has developed an equitable way for law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies to easily identify a foreign power by 
leveraging the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list or the State Sponsors of 
Terrorist list.  For the purpose of using an investigative technique such as FISA, one must 
simply show one of the adherents on the lists are conducting clandestine intelligence 
operations against the U.S. or its interests.  Conversely, it can be argued if a U.S. person 
who is a member of a “domestic terrorism organization,” which at this time is undefined 
within the greater homeland security community, is conducting clandestine intelligence 
operations that one may not use a Title III interception of wire communications until a 
potential crime has been committed.  
The development of a legally defensible process to designate a terrorist as a 
domestic terrorist or domestic terrorist group may arguably be a significant step toward 
assisting law enforcement and homeland security agencies in convincing policy makers 
to recognize the significance of intercepting communications of these adherents.  It is 
anticipated that the introduction of legislation to the U.S. Congress centered on intrusion 
of the government into U.S. citizens’ constitutional rights would immediately be met with 




in order to ensure public safety and security.  It can be further argued if it can be shown 
that predicted domestic terrorists were conducting clandestine intelligence activities, as 
evidenced by the UK after years of combating threats and acts of terrorism, the time for 









IV. CURRENT VALIDATION AND DESIGNATION PROCESSES 
The research has brought to the forefront some salient points to consider when it 
comes to terrorism and the adherents of the same.  These points are: terrorism is bad 
(Bogner, 2007), terrorism is a crime (German, 2007), terrorists are criminals (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2005), and terrorism has a political meaning beyond the crime 
(White, 2006).  The research also suggests that in order to combat terrorism unique 
investigative and intelligence gathering techniques should be employed against terrorists 
(Carlile, 2007).   
Additionally, the research has also identified that the U.S. has used a “brand” 
process to identify other criminals such as gang members and child sex offenders.  
However, when it comes to adherents of domestic terrorism the processes and “branding” 
of a domestic terrorist becomes less defined and largely non-existent.  The following 
sections will examine the various governmental processes that are currently used when 
addressing terrorists (international and domestic), gangs, and sex offenders.  Specific 
focus will be placed on process initiation (i.e., legislative or administrative), designation 
criteria, redress, dissemination, and use limitations. 
A. TERRORISM LISTS 
Current policies and procedures defining and designating foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTO) are well documented and were promulgated by a legislative process. 
The legal criteria for designating FTOs and the process by which to follow are defined 
within section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), (Title 8 U.S.C. 1101).  
The Secretary of State maintains the responsibility of designating and publishing FTOs 
on behalf of the U. S. There are currently 45 FTOs designated by the State Department 
(State Department, 2009).  The State Department is not alone in this process. It is directed 
to consult with the Department of Treasury and the Attorney General prior to completing 
the designation process (State Department, 2009).  The INA establishes three conditions 




engages in terrorist activity, and the terrorist activity threatens the security of U.S. 
persons or the national security of the U.S. (State Department, 2009).   
The FTO list is a readily available to the public via the internet.  Additionally, 
other lists have been established to identify international terrorists and terrorist 
organizations.  These include the State-Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list, Terrorist 
Exclusion List (TEL),30 and the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons 
(SDN) list.  Each one of these lists has specific validation and designation processes.  
Every two to five years the Secretary follows certain review and revocation procedures, 
examining the FTO list to determine relevancy of designation (State Department, 2009).  
Additionally, a FTO may file a petition for revocation two years after designation (State 
Department, 2009).  The effects of being included on one of the aforementioned lists 
provide for various legal processes and administrative sanctions imposed by U.S. law 
enforcement, immigration, Treasury and Executive Branch agencies (State Department, 
2009).  According to the U.S. State Department, there are benefits associated with 
placing a group or an individual on one of these lists, such as: 
…supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and…encourage[s] other 
nations to do the same, [it also] stigmatizes and isolates designated 
terrorist organizations internationally, deters donations or contributions to 
and economic transactions with named organizations, heightens public 
awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations, and signals to other 
governments our concern about named organizations. (U.S. State 
Department, 2009)   
A review of these lists reflect that none of these lists include domestic terrorists or 
groups, or U.S. citizens who have been identified as supporting international terrorism, 
such as Adam Yahiye Gadahn.31 
                                                 
30 Section 411 of the U.S.A PATRIOT Act of 2001 authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Attorney General, to designate terrorist organizations for immigration purposes. 
31 The lists reviewed were located at the State Department Web site located at 





Unlike the FTO list that addresses international terrorism (U.S. Department of 
State, 2009), this researcher has identified only one validation and designation process 
that uses established protocols and is in use by a federal government agency for 
identifying individuals engaged in domestic terrorism for inclusion on a government list. 
That list is the Consolidated Terrorist Watch List housed within the Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC) (Terrorist Screening Center, 2009). 
In September 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6 was 
signed by President Bush (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a).  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 6 directed the Attorney General to establish a process to 
consolidate the government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the 
appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in a screening process (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2009a).  The Watch List that was born out of HSPD 6 does not 
provide for any of the benefits realized by the FTO list.  Specifically, it does not curb 
terrorism financing, encourage other nations to do the same, stigmatize and isolate 
designated terrorist organizations, deter donations, contributions and economic 
transactions with named organizations, heighten public awareness and knowledge of 
terrorist organizations, or signal to other governments our concern about named 
organizations.  This watch list is primarily used for affecting and tracking domestic and 
international travel of suspected terrorists.  A second administrative list, primarily used 
by the FBI, known as the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) has been 
used to further track and identify terrorists (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a).  In June 
2009, the VGTOF was separated into two separate files the Gang File and the Known or 
Appropriately Suspected Terrorist (KST) File (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2009c); 
both of which are accessible to law enforcement agencies through the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC).32    
                                                 
32 NCIC is a nationwide information system run by the FBI.  The system supports criminal justice 
agencies throughout the nation and Canada.  Approved users may research records and in some cases 
nominate individuals in the areas of probation/parole, criminal histories, wants/warrants, gang file, and 




According to the NCIC 2000 Operators Manual, which establishes the policies 
and procedures to be followed by all NCIC users, the TSC alone has the authority to enter 
an individual who has been nominated as a suspected terrorist to the KST file (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2009c).   
In March 2004, the government created a Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2009a).  The Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist merged separate 
watch lists, such as the VGTOF, which had been maintained by other federal agencies 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a).  The consolidated list is managed by the FBI by way 
of its oversight of the TSC (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a).   
The FBI as well as other federal agencies may nominate suspected International 
Terrorists to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which subsequently moves 
the information to the TSC for inclusion into the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2009a). 
The NCTC also enters the nominee into the Terrorist Identities Data Mart 
Environment (TIDE) (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a).  But when the nomination 
involves a suspected domestic terrorist, the FBI is the sole nominator.  In fact, the FBI 
bypasses NCTC and brings the domestic terrorist nominee directly to the TSC (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2009a).  Additionally, the “…TIDE database is prohibited from 
containing purely domestic terrorism information” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a, p. 
viii). 
Terrorist nomination protocols for all contributing agencies for inclusion into the 
TSC terrorist databases are outlined in a document that is classified Sensitive Security 
Information and is not available for review by the general public.  This researcher was 
not able to find any validation and designation processes or protocols for domestic 
terrorist groups in support of nomination to any government list.  The TSC has published 
limited criteria for nominating individuals suspected of being domestic terrorists as part 
of the Watch Listing process (Terrorist Screening Center, 2009).  Research has identified 
criteria used by the FBI to establish what is considered a terrorist, for nomination 




General Audit of the FBI’s terrorist watch list nomination practices (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2009a).  According to the audit, the FBI begins the watch list nomination process, 
“Whenever an FBI field office opens a preliminary or full international terrorism 
investigation or a full domestic terrorism investigation” (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2009a, p. 4).  In order to further identify specific criteria to define what constitutes the 
terms preliminary and full investigations, the FBI must rely on the U.S. Attorney 
General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey, 2008).  According to the 
guidelines, a “Preliminary investigation may be initiated on the basis of any allegation or 
information indicative of possible criminal or national security-threatening activity, but 
more substantial factual predication is required for full investigations” (Mukasey, 2008, 
p. 18).  The guidelines also define terrorism and terrorist actions with reference to Title 
18 U.S.C. 2331, 2332b (g)(5)(B), and 43.33   
In summary, in order for the FBI to nominate a suspected terrorist to the NCTC or 
TSC, which would eventually be placed into the VGTOF/KST, it must first initiate a 
preliminary or full terrorism investigation following the legal definitions reflected in the 
aforementioned statutes.  This would be the totality of the nomination standards/criteria 
for the FBI when it comes to domestic terrorists.  With reference to redress procedures, 
per FBI policy at the close of the investigation the individual must be removed from the 
Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009a).  There are some 
limited circumstances to permit an individual to remain on the list such as when the 
individual is known to have left the U.S. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009).  If an 
individual becomes aware of their name being associated with terrorism, there are no 
redress procedures for the nominated individual to personally challenge the FBI’s 
nomination process.   
To date VGTOF/KST and the Consolidated Watchlist are the only repositories for 
the FBI to publish or identify a domestic terrorism subject, who has not been formally 
charged, to the greater homeland security community.  This research has established the 
individuals placed into VGTOF/KST or the Consolidated Watchlist only become 
                                                 




available if the adherents name and/or identifiers are searched by an authorized user of 
these disparate databases.  The research has also established there is no validation or 
nomination process established by any federal government agency for the nomination of 
a domestic terrorism group to any homeland security information sharing system.  
Additionally, there are no processes for the FBI to nominate a domestic or international 
terrorist group for inclusion into VGTOF/KST or the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist.       
Unlike the previously identified lists concerning international terrorists, 
individuals identified in VGTOF/KST or the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist are subject 
to limited administrative sanctions and no legal sanctions.  One of most significant legal 
actions that may be enforced against individuals assisting an FTO involves “Providing 
Material Support to Terrorists” (Title 18 U.S.C. 2339A).  According to this statute, any 
monetary or tangible service provided by an individual in support of terrorism may be 
subject to the legal ramifications as stated within the material support statute (Title 18 
U.S.C. 2339A). This statute can be directly applied to an individual who is identified as 
supporting a designated FTO.  For example, according to the State Department, Al-Qaida 
is a designated FTO (2009).  If an individual is found to be providing money or any 
tangible assets in support of Al-Qaida then they may be charged with material support.  
The research has not uncovered the use of material support being successfully charged 
against a domestic terrorism group or its supporters.  It can be argued, that because there 
are no government designation processes for designating a domestic terrorism group the 
statue may not be as easily applied.   
Two additional lists of note are the publically available FBI’s Most Wanted 
Terrorist (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.b.) and Domestic Terrorism lists (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, n.d.a.).  These lists are the only repositories for the FBI to 
externally publish or identify a domestic terror subject (post-indictment) to law 
enforcement, selected communities of interest, or the public.  Both lists provide 
information concerning fugitives who have been criminally charged and are associated 
with terrorism or domestic terrorism, respectively.  For instance, FBI fugitive and animal 




Terrorist list (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.b.).  However, these lists do not 
identify known or suspected domestic terror subjects or groups, regardless of their 
criminal history or current threat, unless or until they have been charged with a federal 
crime, unlike the criteria used to be placed on the FTO list.  
B. CRIMINAL LISTS 
One of the most recognizable public criminal designation processes is, The Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which stems from the Adam Walsh 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008b).  The stated 
purpose of the Adam Walsh Act is: 
In order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against 
children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against 
the victims listed below, Congress in this Act establishes a comprehensive 
national system for the registration of those offenders. (United States 
Congress, 2006, Section 102)  
SORNA establishes a set of comprehensive standards for sex offender registration 
within the United States (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008b). The national sex offender 
registry is broken down into two different registries. The first is the National Sex 
Offender Registry (NSOR), which is the responsibility of the FBI to maintain through the 
use of the NCIC, and the second is the Office of Justice Programs’ Dru Sjodin National 
Sex Offender Public Registry, which may be viewed on a public Web site (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008c).  The NSOR registry houses the names of, “individuals 
convicted of criminal offenses against minors, convicted of sexually violent offenses, and 
individuals who are designated as sexually violent predators” (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008c, p. i). 
The Public Law specifically defines the term sex offender as an individual who 
was convicted of a sex offense (United States Congress, 2006).  According to this 
legislation, the registry requirements are imposed on the offender and are to be enforced 
by each state and in coordination with the Attorney General of the United States (United 




registry, the U.S. Marshal Service has been designated as the lead federal agency for 
investigating non-compliant sex offenders and to assist states in enforcing registration 
requirements (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008c, p. ii).   
As part of the national registration process, the sex offender is required to keep 
their registration current in each jurisdiction where they reside.  Failure of the sex 
offender to register may subject them to legal action and possible imprisonment by 
federal and state government law enforcement agencies (United States Congress, 2006). 
Participating states have enacted their own sex offender laws and corresponding registry 
requirements (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008c).  Although the states must meet the 
minimum federal registration requirements, individual states may establish more stringent 
ones as well (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008c). 
Each jurisdiction is mandated to make the registration available to the public 
through the use of the Internet (United States Congress, 2006).  Additionally, the U.S. 
Attorney General is tasked with maintaining a National Sex Offender Public Website 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2008c).  This site is known as the Dru Sjodin Web site, 
which is available through the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART) Web site (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008c).  The Web site is a portal to all participating local jurisdictions. The Dru 
Sjodin Website is a one-stop-shop for nationwide inquiries.  The duration of registration 
for the sex offender may vary from 15 years to life depending on the degree of the 
offense (United States Congress, 2006). 
Based on the procedures outlined in the aforementioned legislation, sex offenders 
are broken down into three tiers depending on the level of criminal activity.  For 
example, a Tier III sex offender is an offender whose offense was punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year (United States Congress, 2006).    
Not unlike terrorism, there is no federal crime for being a member of a gang. 
Perpetrators are prosecuted for violations of various criminal laws.  Often, some of the 
same violations a terrorist may be prosecuted for such as homicide, arson, or money 




…an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of five or more 
persons—  
(A)  that has as 1 of its primary purposes the commission of 1 or more of 
the criminal offenses described in subsection (c);  
(B)  the members of which engage, or have engaged within the past 5 
years, in a continuing series of offenses described in subsection (c); and  
(C)  the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.  
“State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and 
any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States” (Title 18 
U.S.C. 521). 
The national effort to combat criminal gang violence has led various law 
enforcement agencies to establish gang and gang member validation, designation, and 
intelligence collection processes.  According to the NCIC 2000 Operators Manual, a 
contributing agency may enter a gang into the NCIC Gang File if the following criteria 
are met: 
1. The group must be an ongoing organization, association, or group of three 
or more persons; and, 
2. The group must have a common interest and/or activity characterized by 
the commission of or involvement in a pattern of criminal activity or 
delinquent conduct.  (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2009c, p. 5) 
The manual further defines criminal conduct as “…narcotics distribution, firearms 
or explosives violations, murder, extortion, obstruction of justice, and other violent 
offenses such as assault, threat and burglary…” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2009c, 
p. 5). 
The retention periods for these records within NCIC are indefinite or as 
determined by the originating agency (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2009c, p. 5).  




The Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, has an established 
National Gang Center Web site that provides access to the latest research about gangs and 
links to tools and databases (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009c).  The site makes note 
that the definitions of gang and gang membership varies widely throughout the country.  
Therefore, validation and designation processes vary as well. The site does provide 
widely accepted criteria to define a gang as: 
• The group has three or more members, generally aged 12–24.  
• Members share an identity, typically linked to a name, and often other 
symbols.  
• Members view themselves as a gang, and they are recognized by others as 
a gang.  
• The group has some permanence and a degree of organization.  
• The group is involved in an elevated level of criminal activity. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2009c) 
The FBI recognizes these criteria as it applies to a nationally recognized gang 
known as the 18th Street Gang (M. Escorza, personal communication, September 16, 
2008).  According to an FBI program manager, the FBI does not have established 
validation requirements (M. Escorza, personal communication, September 16, 2008).  
The FBI looks to local law enforcement agencies for validation purposes (M. Escorza, 
personal communication, September 16, 2008).    
According to the FBI program manager, examples of some of the criteria used by 
various local law enforcement agencies in California include: self admission, tattoos 
depicting gang affiliation, style of dress, use of hand signals, reliable informant 
identification, associates with known gang members, prior arrest with known gang 
members, and attendance at gang functions (M. Escorza, personal communication, 






The 18th Street Gang is also publicly identified on the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s Gang Injunctions list (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009).  There are 
currently 37 active injunctions in the city of Los Angeles involving 57 gangs.34  A gang 
injunction is a restraining order against a group (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009). 
The purpose of the injunction is a civil process to declare a gang’s public behavior a 
nuisance (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009).  Once declared, special rules may be 
directed toward the gang’s activity.  The identity/name of the gang is subsequently posted 
on a public Web site.  The purpose of the injunction is also to “…address the 
neighborhood’s gang problem before it reaches the level of felony crime activity” (Los 
Angeles Police Department, 2009).  Because there is a civil process for the designation of 
a group to the injunction list a designated group may use the same civil process for 
redress as well.  Although the city of Los Angeles publically identifies validated gangs, 
they do not publically identify gang members.  According to Detective Tracey Angeles of 
the Los Angeles Police Department, once a gang member has been validated, criminal 
investigations and collection of intelligence in support of the same may be initiated 
against the validated subject (personal communication, March 5, 2010).  Additionally, a 
validated gang member is also entered into a database known as CalGang (T. Angeles, 
personal communication, March 5, 2010).  CalGang is a state-funded database operated 
and maintained by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office (T. Angeles, personal 
communication, March 5, 2010).  CalGang’s mission is to provide participating law 
enforcement agencies with accurate and timely statewide gang related intelligence 
information (California Office of the Attorney General, 2010).  The CalGang system 
operates as a criminal intelligence system and operates pursuant to United States Code 28 
CFR part 23 (California Office of the Attorney General, 2010).    
 
 
                                                 
34 The Los Angeles Police Department’s Gang Injunction Web site is continually being updated and 




Addressing gang violence is not limited to the federal government or major 
metropolitan law enforcement agencies.  For example, the Anchorage (Alaska) Police 
Department has an established gang validation process.  According to Criminal 
Intelligence Officer D. Scott Lofthouse, the Anchorage Police Department (APD) has a 
regulations and procedures manual for identification, classification, validation, 
intelligence storage, and purge criteria for gangs and gang members (personal 
communication, April 13, 2010).  The APD procedures rely heavily on compliance with 
28 CFR Part 23. According to the APD regulations, the criteria for an individual who 
meets a standard of reasonable suspicion for involvement in a gang related crime, self 
admits to being a gang member, or has been documented as being an active participant in 
a gang and validated by a Gang Specialist Officer may be designated as a gang member 
(D. Lofthouse, personal communication, April 13, 2010).  Once designated, the gang or 
gang member is placed into a database for intelligence and information sharing purposes. 
The gang database file is reviewed for purging based on a five-year retention period per 
entry (D. Lofthouse, personal communication, April 13, 2010).  If no gang or related 
criminal activity has been recorded for the entry, for the previous five years, the record 
would be purged from the system (D. Lofthouse, personal communication, April 13, 
2010).  The APD gang files are not specific to U.S. or non-U.S. persons and are not 
available to the public (D. Lofthouse, personal communication, April 13, 2010). 
Both CalGang and the APD follow the guidelines of 28 CFR Part 23.  As the 
research has previously established, if a criminal intelligence system fails to comply with 
the operating policies of 28 CFR Part 23 federal funding may be forfeit.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs has significant oversight of the 
compliance and funding processes as they relate to 28 CFR Part 23.  A closer review of 
the policy reveals that 28 CFR Part 23 also establishes and standardizes how and why 
these criminal intelligence systems should operate.  For example, the policy recognizes 
that individuals involved in various criminal activities such as drug trafficking, 
smuggling, and corruption employ some degree of regular coordination and involve 
participants over a broad geographical area and the pooling of that information may be 




need to protect the privacy and civil liberties of individuals.  According to the policy, the 
standard of reasonable suspicion is used as the overriding predication for collection of 
criminal intelligence:  
…when information exists which establishes sufficient facts to give a 
trained law enforcement officer or criminal investigative agency officer, 
investigator, or employee a basis to believe that there is a reasonable 
possibility that and individual or organization is involved in a definable 
criminal activity or enterprise. (28 CFR Part 23, p. 3)   
Consequently, this would be a consistent predication standard for all intelligence 
databases that are 28 CFR Part 23 compliant such as CalGang.  The policy also defines 
Criminal Intelligence in the following manner:  
(3) Criminal Intelligence Information means data which has been 
evaluated to determine that it: (i) is relevant to the identification of and the 
criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is 
reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity, and (ii) meets 
criminal intelligence system submission criteria. (28 CFR Part 23) 
C. SUMMARY 
The research has established that organizations and individuals involved in 
criminal and terrorist activities have been “branded” by local, state, and federal 
government agencies through the use of legislative and administrative policies.  There is 
also a distinction of when and how a group or individual is “branded” (e.g., initiation of 
an investigation, civil or criminal action, etc…).  The degree of to whom the information 
is disseminated varies widely as well (e.g., public or limited, need-to-know, etc…).  From 
the review of all of the aforementioned processes this researcher has compiled the 
following findings (see Appendix B): 
1. If a terrorist group is non-U.S. based their identities will be widely 
distributed publically in accordance with an established U.S. legislative 
process (FTO).  Likewise the name of a criminal gang may be publically 
identified (Gang Injunction).  In both cases special civil/criminal actions 
may be imposed on these groups.  There are no such processes or 




2. If a terrorist is a non-U.S. citizen and in support of a non-U.S. based 
terrorist group their names will be distributed publically such as the 
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.  The terrorists 
name may also be published through the TSC which feeds the 
aforementioned list. 
3. If a terrorist is a U.S. person (not yet indicted on criminal charges) and is 
in support of an FTO their name is only published to lists that are not 
available to the public but are widely distributed to a select group with 
need-to-know accesses to the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist.   
4. If a terrorist is purely domestic in nature only the FBI may nominate them 
for inclusion into the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist.  There are limited 
criteria for the FBI to follow when nominating a domestic terrorist.  There 
are some terrorist lists which purely domestic terrorists will be excluded 
for example, the TIDE database.  The dissemination of the domestic 
terrorist’s name is limited to need-to-know and is not distributed to the 
public. 
5. If you are charged with criminal activity in furtherance of terrorism and 
are considered a fugitive, domestic or foreign, the FBI may publish the 
name publically. 
6. If a terrorist is convicted of a crime in support of terrorism, domestic or 
foreign, or an investigation is completed the FBI must remove their name 
from the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist. 
7. There is no process for a state or other federal agencies, outside the FBI, 
for nominating a domestic terrorist to the TSC. 
8. An individual may be identified as a gang member (citizen or Non-U.S. 
citizen) following specific validation requirements.  Once validated the 
members identity is published with a limited need-to-know distribution 
(i.e. - CalGang and VGTOF/Gang).  
9. If an individual is convicted of a sex offense (citizen or non-U.S. citizen) 
their name is published publically post-conviction. 
10. A convicted sex offender may also suffer criminal sanctions for non-
compliance.  Post-conviction, a process has been established to monitor a 
convicted sex offender’s movements.   
11. In examples where individuals or groups were published to the public, a 






Conversely, lists that were published based on a need-to-know were 
established by administrative actions such as Presidential Directives or 
internal agency policies.     
12. There is no list or government process to publish and track the names of 
individuals convicted of crimes in support of terrorism. 
When it comes to addressing domestic terrorism adherents, this researcher was 
unable to find any process for designating a domestic terrorist group.  Additionally, there 
are no legislative or administrative actions that may be imposed on individuals who 
support a purely domestic terrorist group.  Therefore, if terrorism is just a crime then a 
domestic terrorist or domestic terrorist group should be treated with like processes, as 









V. STOP HUNTINGDON ANIMAL CRUELTY (SHAC) CASE 
STUDY: A FOCUS ON THE VULNERABILITIES 
As the book The Starfish and the Spider points out, the Animal Liberation Front 
(ALF) is one of the “biggest decentralized organizations in Europe and America” 
(Brafman & Beckstrom, 2007, p. 137).  Brafman and Beckstrom further claim that ALF 
is more akin to an ideological based following such as al Qaeda (2007, p. 140).  Because 
ALF is so decentralized, it is more of a movement than an identifiable organizational 
structure (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2007).  The FBI considers ALF to be a serious 
domestic terrorist threat (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002).  It can be argued that 
with these types of decentralized organizations it is the ideology that identifies a common 
cause that aids in recruitment and justifies the use of violence (University of Maryland, 
2009).  Therefore, homeland security agencies are continually trying to identify a moving 
target. 
This is not to say the followers of ALF are the only domestic terrorism adherents 
that follow an ideology; environmentalist, anti-abortionists and white-supremacists all 
believe they are acting in support of a special cause or calling.  Research conducted by 
the University of Maryland affirmed that “ideology is a core component of terrorism” 
(2009, p. 7).  Because domestic terrorism causes and adherents are often ideology-based 
there may not be a single leader.  If so, the leader does not necessarily give specific 
orders for criminal actions to take place.  A common problem with investigating domestic 
terrorism adherents is the type of criminal activity they conduct.  The criminal actions or 
direct actions are historically violations of local and state laws and go unnoticed (White, 
2006).  Therefore, the FBI may be unaware of potential domestic terrorism adherents.  As 
the research has indicated, the FBI has lead responsibility for investigating domestic 
terrorism on behalf of the federal government.  Conversely, state and local law 
enforcement may not know if significant FBI domestic terrorism subjects are living in 





connection with a local criminal investigation and make inquires through NCIC. One 
such domestic terrorism group who historically has operated within the U.S. is Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC).  
Although SHAC is known to have originated in the United Kingdom (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2004), SHAC-UK, it is important to examine SHAC’s activities 
within the United States, SHAC-US. The following case study will provide a brief history 
of the group, its structure, objectives, motivations, and different stages of evolution. 
Consequently, it can be argued throughout the case study, because this was a U.S.-based 
group composed of U.S. persons, significant opportunities to deter and prevent domestic 
terrorism actions may have been missed because there is no validation and designation 
process for domestic terrorism adherents. 
SHAC was established in the UK in 1999 following campaigns of economic 
sabotage against farms that bred animals for scientific research (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2004). SHAC’s single objective was the complete closure of Huntingdon Life 
Sciences (HLS), a UK-based animal research laboratory headquartered in Cambridge, 
England with facilities in Suffolk, England (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).  In 2000, 
HLS opened a facility in East Millstone, New Jersey.  Shortly thereafter SHAC-US was 
founded and their voice was Kevin Kjonaas (Anti-Defamation League, 2009).  From the 
inception of SHAC-US, Kjonaas and the corporate officers operated above ground, 
unlike the leaderless society affiliates within the ALF, which the FBI has identified as a 
domestic terrorism movement (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005).  Due to various 
SHAC-US objectives and motivations, coupled with law enforcement activities, SHAC-
US was forced to undergo several organizational changes. The most recent was a more 
risk-based operational structure due to the successful prosecution of the SHAC-7 in 
March 2006 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). 
It is important to note that although SHAC-US developed as a hierarchical 
organization, there was no evidence to show SHAC-US was subordinate to SHAC-UK. It 
was also clear both organizations had the same published primary objective—shutting 




tactics and techniques such as various levels of lawful and unlawful activity, including: 
harassing HLS employees and clients using threats, telephone blockages, black faxes, 
false mail-orders, and home visits (United States District Court District of New Jersey, 
2005).  Extremists also engaged in “direct actions” against HLS and its business partners 
within the U.S. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005). These direct actions included 
vandalism, property destruction, bomb and death threats, office invasions, cyber-attacks, 
and theft (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006).  
This phenomenon of best practices was described by Horacio R. Trujillo (2005), 
in the book Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning 
in Five Terrorist Groups.  As a contributing author, Trujillo devoted a chapter examining 
this phenomenon.  In the chapter titled “The Radical Environmentalist Movement,” 
Trujillo indicates the assessment of organizational learning in radical environmentalist 
organizations requires an appreciation of how such learning can be transmitted through 
informal social processes, as well as formal ones (Trujillo, 2005).  Trujillo further 
mentioned that the two groups, which he was examining, were part of a social movement 
as much as, if not more than, a formal organization (Trujillo, 2005).  It should also be 
noted that SHAC-US was not designated as a domestic terrorism organization or openly 
identified on any list published to the law enforcement community, or other communities 
of interest. At this time a domestic terrorism validation and designation process could 
have been applied to the individuals committing the direct actions against HLS.  Not 
unlike a criminal gang member committing a criminal act in furtherance of the gang’s 
agenda or an FTO targeting U.S. interests. 
Kjonaas, who was purported to have already been involved in support of the ALF 
movement, would have been familiar with the clandestine world of Animal Rights 
extremists that had no formal membership (Anti-Defamation League, 2009).  This was 
largely due to Kjonaas leveraging the appeal of shared risk and underlying shared 
purpose to expand the SHAC agenda.  This is not unlike what is seen today with the Al’ 
Qai’da inspired home-grown threats.  Therefore, it can be argued that Kjonaas may have 




the more clandestine ALF extremists to follow through independent of any organizational 
direction.  Kjonaas would have understood what was meant by the phrase “direct action” 
in the world of extremists, due to his prior involvement with ALF but would have also 
understood the meaning of “First Amendment Protected Activities,” presenting law 
enforcement with an uphill battle to hold him accountable.  
Because there was no accepted definition of domestic terrorism, or a designation 
process, local law enforcement was continually challenged.  The SHAC mindset was 
further identified in an article published by the SHAC Support Fund, after the SHAC-7 
were charged, which stated in part; “While the charges themselves sound alarming, the 
defendants are not actually accused of having personally engaged in terrorist or 
threatening acts.  Instead, the government’s case centers around the idea that 
aboveground organizers of a campaign are responsible for any and all acts that anyone 
engages in while furthering the goals of the organizers” (SHAC-7, 2010).  Initially, from 
2000–2001, SHAC-US affiliated groups and chapters were identified throughout the U.S. 
primarily internal to the FBI, disparate law enforcement agencies, and independently by a 
few animal rights extremist watch-dog groups.  There was no formalized list identifying 
the groups or their members that was published to all the communities of interest. 
The SHAC-US organization started to take on a different appearance from 2002–
2004.  These activities led to the arrest of Kjonaas in 2004 for his involvement with 
different activities with SHAC (Anti-Defamation League, 2009).  Additional 
aboveground members became public, and there was a landmark Supreme Court decision 
that created an environment for AR Extremists to feel they may have found a loophole in 
the federal law that they could exploit.  In the past, some of the aforementioned criminal 
conduct was prosecuted as a violation of the Hobbs Act, Title 18 United States Code 951, 
but in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, where the Supreme Court held, 
“…in order to commit the extortion that is the gravamen of a Hobbs Act violation, a 
defendant must actually ‘obtain’ property” (Supreme Court of the United States, 2003).  
So, theoretically furnishing names, addresses, and identifying information of HLS 




actions taken against them were not for the benefit of the perpetrators, under federal law.  
Clearly at this time, it could be argued that SHAC-US was conducting clandestine 
intelligence activity for the purpose of furthering terrorist activity.  But, as previously 
argued, law enforcement could not use FISA or Title III investigative measures for the 
purpose of intercepting this type of clandestine domestic intelligence gathering by a 
purely domestic group.  Among federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, it was 
common knowledge that most of the criminal actions were low level crimes that could 
have been charged as local crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005).   
As stated in the indictment of SHAC and its founders, “It was further part of the 
conspiracy that the defendants espoused and encouraged others to engage in ‘direct 
action,’ which was directed as described by SHAC involved activities that ‘operate 
outside the confines of the legal system’…” (United States District Court District of New 
Jersey, 2005).  These types of actions included physical assault, vandalism, smashing 
windows, flooding homes, bomb hoaxes, and damaging property (United States District 
Court District of New Jersey, 2005).  The SHAC-US Web site expanded with in-depth 
information on possible targets, and the results of direct actions were also published 
(Anti-Defamation League, 2009).  In large part, SHAC-US was engaging in 
institutionalized knowledge management as described by Trujillo (2005, p. 143).  At this 
point in time, if a domestic terrorism validation and designation process would have been 
in place, it could be argued individuals committing low level criminal actions and SHAC-
US could have been validated and designated as domestic terrorism individuals and/or 
domestic terrorist group.  This would have provided law enforcement with a clear 
understanding of the national threat posed by SHAC. 
Up until this time, Kjonaas and SHAC-US were successful in developing an 
organizational structure that leveraged the advantages of an aboveground hierarchy. 
While operating under what they perceived as minimal risk as a clandestine resistance 
operated with little exposure as they conducted unlawful activities.  This was evidenced 





crimes committed against SHAC’s publicly named targets.  Applying the elements as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. 2339, arguably the self-proclaimed ALF members should be seen as 
providing Material Support to SHAC.   
One such incident occurred in Salt Lake City in June of 2001.  Vandals smashed 
display windows at Bed Bath & Beyond.  The ALF claimed credit for this direct action 
(SHAC, 2010).  After examination it was found the stores’ corporate office had 
unspecified financial dealings with a New Jersey investment company suspected of 
holding shares of HLS stock.  These direct actions were having a noticeable toll on HLS 
as well as its financial and business partners.  According to the indictment:  
After the May 30, 2001 attack on the home of DD, the SHAC Website 
posted names and home addresses of HLS employees and stated with 
respect to DD that his home “was visited several times, had car windows 
broke, tires slashed, [and his] house spray painted with slogans.  His wife 
is reportedly on the brink of a nervous breakdown and divorce.” (United 
States District Court District of New Jersey, 2005).  
Along with this success came the moniker of being labeled a domestic terrorism 
threat during Congressional testimony by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2005), but there was no official validation or designation of SHAC-US as a domestic 
terrorism group by the FBI.  Individuals could continue to contribute financially and offer 
material support to SHAC-US without the threat of government action as would befall 
the same actions if they were offering the same support to a designated international 
terrorist or group such as an FTO.  Clearly the actions taken by SHAC-US and its 
supporters fit the definition of domestic terrorism as defined through the use of the 
equation presented previously: 
Criminal Action35 + Motivation = Domestic Terrorism 
Due to this type of organizational structure, the membership of SHAC-US has 
never been fully identified, which could be considered a success up to this point of the 
case study. But as described by Della Porta (1995, pp. 113-135), who examined political 
                                                 
35 Criminal actions are further defined as; committed within the United States or its territories without 




violence and social movements in Europe, groups that try to operate in more open 
organizational models decrease their life expectancy (Porta, 1995).  Unfortunately, for 
Kjonaas, in a 2005 superseding indictment, he and his corporate members, along with the 
SHAC-US Corporation, were indicted on charges of animal enterprise terrorism under the 
Animal Enterprise Protection Act, Title 18 U.S.C. 43 (United States District Court 
District of New Jersey, 2005).  This would be the first time this charge was successfully 
prosecuted in federal court against an organization.  This promulgated another 
organizational change. 
Prior to the indictment, in August 2004, Pamela Ferdin, AKA Pamela Vlasak 
became the legal president of SHAC-US (Animal Scam.com, 2010).  The SHAC Website 
became more media oriented, and campaign coordination activities became even more 
decentralized as regional animal rights leaders assumed these new responsibilities.  There 
was no longer any recognizable organizational structure other than Ferdin, since there 
was no evidence the regional leaders reported to Ferdin.  As the case against Kjonaas and 
his co-conspirators was being advanced, the U.S. was moving a legislative change to the 
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act through Congress.  This change would expose AR 
extremists to a broader scope of activities to be investigated by law enforcement.  
In March of 2006, the SHAC-7 (six defendants and the corporation) were found 
guilty, and in November of 2006 Congress passed an updated version of the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act that expanded the coverage to secondary and tertiary targets.  A 
new Web site was created after a court mandated the termination of the former SHAC-US 
site.  The new site offered the names and home addresses of more than 2,000 
pharmaceutical companies associated with HLS.  Interestingly, even with this huge 
setback, other splinter groups such as “Win Animal Rights” have continued to encourage 
supporters to participate in the campaign to shut down HLS (W.A.R., 2010). 
Per FBI policy, individuals who had been entered into VGTOF during a terrorism 
investigation must be removed after the cases had been closed (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2009, p. iv).  Therefore, it should be noted none of the convicted SHAC-6 nor the 




Since the events of September 11, there has not been a successful attack by any 
international terrorism group in the U.S., unlike the success of the AR Extremists who 
have shown great success.  According to current FBI reporting, from 2003–2008 AR 
Extremists committed 597 criminal acts.  Of those, 199 incidents involved violence or 
threats of violence (33 percent) (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009d).  The violent 
activities include bombing, arson, attempted arson, physical altercations, and BB/pellet 
gun use in property destruction.  Additionally, other types of criminal activity including 
animal theft, cyber attacks, harassment, theft, and threats can also instill fear as well as 
financial loss. Although there was no evidence of loss of human life, most of the 
aforementioned criminal activity was considered by law enforcement to result in the same 
effect as an act of violence. Clearly, the threat and use of criminal activity by AR 
Extremism is noticeably becoming more prevalent within the U.S., but consequently, has 
not garnered national attention as have the activities by well-known international terrorist 
groups.  As argued by Brannan, the United States has made the distinction between 
domestic and international terrorism because policy makers do not see the domestic threat 
to be as dangerous as the international threat (2002).  
During the analysis, it became obvious SHAC-US was not successful in meeting 
its objective of shutting down HLS; however, SHAC-US was successful in evolving and 
motivating a following of individuals willing to advance their campaign.  From the 
outset, SHAC’s stated objective had no timetable associated with it, and there is no 
evidence SHAC-US has been dismantled.  For these reasons, it is believed by various AR 
outlets and law enforcement intelligence services that the campaign against HLS will 
continue but perhaps in a more clandestine fashion.  Perhaps the more clandestine groups 
may also increase their level of violence if they feel a lack of success and become more 






While much of the national attention is focused on the substantial threat 
posed by international terrorists to the homeland, the United States must 
also contend with an ongoing threat posed by domestic terrorists based 
and operating strictly within the United States. Domestic terrorists, 
motivated by a number of political or social issues, continue to use 
violence and criminal activity to further their agendas. (Mueller, 2010) 
This research focused on the domestic terrorist threat to the homeland and 
vulnerabilities associated with the absence of a validation and designation process for 
domestic terrorism individuals and groups.  The protection of the citizenry from a 
terrorist action is paramount but must be equally balanced with the protection of privacy 
and civil liberties (9/11 Commission, 2004). 
As represented by the strategy canvas in Figure 1, the value innovation of this 
research was to establish a domestic terrorism validation and designation process to 
provide a national effort in standardizing domestic terrorism awareness, investigations, 
and intelligence collection throughout the country.  Issues such as inadvertent 
impingement of First Amendment protected activities should be diminished.  Both law 
enforcement as well as the public will have a clearly defined understanding of who is a 
domestic terrorist.  The research has also brought to light that the branding of U.S. 
persons who commit or are attempting to commit crimes within the U.S. is not unique.  
The U. S. has employed acceptable processes for designating and tracking sex offenders 
(e.g., NSOR, and violent street gangs (e.g., CalGang) and Gang Injunctions).  These 
efforts have focused law enforcement and community efforts to take preemptive action 
without violating a person’s constitutional rights.  The ability to subject domestic 
terrorism adherents to administrative and legal sanctions like those imposed on 
designated members of FTOs, sex offenders, and gangs would be of significant benefit to 
U.S counterterrorism efforts. 
But what is a terrorist?  When researching the answer to this question, neither the 




establishes a straight forward equation in which to satisfy the most critical part of a 
domestic terrorism validation and designation process, which is, what is a domestic 
terrorist?  This researcher proposes the following equation to answer this pointed 
question: Criminal Action36 + Motivation = Domestic Terrorism37 
The use of this equation further emphasizes the difference between a terrorist and 
a criminal whose motivations are purely outside the political or social change arena.  
A. DEVELOPING A DESIGNATION PROCESS 
The Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) list has a well documented process.  
The research has established that through the legislative process the U.S. felt it necessary 
to publically identify foreign terrorist organizations with hopes to bring legal clarity to 
efforts to identify and prosecute members of terrorist organizations and those who 
support them (Cronin, 2003, p. 7).  As such, the designation criteria for identifying a 
domestic terrorism organization (DTO) should be the same as an FTO with three distinct 
changes: 
1. The organization is Domestic. 
2. The organization engages in terrorist activity. 
3. The terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States citizens or 
the national security of the United States. 
The benefits of having a DTO list will be the same as Cronin (2003, p. 7) 
identified when evaluating the benefits of an FTO:  
The advantage of using the formal FTO designation is the list provides 
legal clarity for law enforcement purposes.  The list further assists 
decision makers with a focal point for counterterrorism efforts.  In effect, 
all agencies have an understanding; if you are on the list you are subject to 
further scrutiny: Having a focal point for agency coordination enhances 
the effectiveness of government implementation and may also serve as a 
deterrent to organizations that consider engaging in illegal behavior. 
(Cronin, 2003, p. 7)    
                                                 
36 Criminal actions are further defined as; committed within the United States or its territories without 
direction from a foreign power. 




But what about the individual who seeks to espouse their views in the exercise of 
free speech?  The research has established that there is a paradigm that develops when 
that individual is a U.S. person or a foreign national.  “U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights 
are very important and not to be taken lightly. This is especially true when labeling 
someone as a “terrorist,” since the word has been used to paint political opponents 
negatively rather to simply identify some reality” (D. Brannan, personal communication, 
April 28, 2010).  But as realized by the branding of a sex offender the public looks to a 
judicial process to balance these civil liberties.  Fortunately, when it comes to terrorism, 
the courts have already recognized how to define a terrorist.  The United States’ 
Sentencing Guidelines have a specified terrorist enhancement, 3A1.4, which clearly 
defines a terrorist action (United States Sentencing Commission, 2008).  This research 
supports the perspective that if an individual is subjected to this enhancement the 
individual is branded a terrorist and subsequent sanctions may be imposed, much like the 
registration requirements of a sex offender and this is a positive move in defending 
against domestic terrorism.   
B. THE WAY FORWARD 
The FBI should lead law enforcement in developing a strategic process that will 
include specific communities of interest to target the domestic terrorism.  The research 
has established that the FBI’s roles and responsibilities in addressing domestic terrorism 
are inculcated throughout its culture, policies, and legislative responsibilities.  The FBI 
has a pre-established domestic terrorism program within its Counterterrorism Division, 
which is responsible for direct program management oversight of all FBI domestic 
terrorism investigations and intelligence collection.  But where the FBI, and for that 
matter the federal government, is lacking is how to engage the greater homeland security 
community and the public in defining and identifying the domestic threat.  Utilizing the 
established infrastructure, the FBI should develop a validation process that defines and 
leads to the designation of a domestic terrorist. The FBI should identify specific 
validation requirements much like those used in validating a gang member.  Once 




validation requirements to the greater homeland security community and the 800,000 law 
enforcement officers throughout the nation (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009b).  In turn, 
law enforcement may incorporate the validation and designation process into its day-to-
day investigative and intelligence collection activities. These legally defensible standards 
would ultimately encourage information sharing between all agencies thereby fostering 
an environment for the United States to understand the domestic terrorism threat.  
Additionally, by leveraging the current watch listing process, the FBI would not be the 
only agency working to identify the next Timothy McVeigh.   
A strategic plan built around the concept of common purpose would help facilitate 
worth and mutual empowerment for all communities of interests “…within and beyond 
their organization” (Byson, 2004, p. 309).  By properly defining and implementing a 
process for designating a domestic terrorism individual or group law enforcement will be 
able to defend the nation against another Oklahoma City style attack. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A domestic terrorism validation and designation process is not a process that can 
be easily developed and implemented on a national level.  Social norms and political 
tolerance should be taken into account during the process.  The state of Arizona’s attempt 
to develop such a process promulgated legislative actions and public cries of 
impingement of constitutional freedoms.  Future researchers should take into account the 
events of the day (i.e., demands of the citizenry in the wake of a domestic terrorist 
attack.)  Tied to what was found in this research was the absence of information 
associated with the recidivism of terrorists.  Therefore, additional research should be 
conducted and data compiled in support of a domestic terrorism validation and 
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Yes, if they take on 
that brand they are 
considered to be 
part of that criminal 
group. "The 
member makes the 
proclamation" This 
is one of the 
benefits.  
20. 
No. No. No. Yes. No. No. Yes. Yes.  Yes. This is a 
benefit. It may 
educate people 
on who they 
are supporting. 
No, it should help to 
demonstrate "we 






We deal with 
that now. 












 This would 
make it more 
clear for law 
enforcement. 
It depends on how 
each group wants 
to bring about the 
change. One is 
persecution and 
one is threat of 
force. 
 












This is a 
guidelines 












No-if that organization 
changed yes (those 




Yes. Yes. Yes. By design you 
don't. 
No. No. Depend.  You would force 
the legitimate 
wing to detach 
from the criminal 
wing. 
You would have to 
show direction and 
control by group 
leadership - this takes 
away the First 
Amendment rights. 
You have decided to 
stay with a group that 
has been publicly 





1. How do you define terrorism? 
2. How do you define a terrorist? 
3. Would identifying a group as a terrorist organization assist law 
enforcement and the Intelligence Community in collection of information 
on individuals or groups? 
4. Will developing a validation process assist in the identification of 
individuals associated with known terrorist individuals and groups? 
5. Will this process assist in alleviating the need for the three prongs to make 
a DT case? a. Force or violence; b. Political or social agenda; c. Violation 
of federal law 
6. Will an established validation process result in increased reporting by the 
public? 
7. Will a process enable infringement on the First Amendment without civil 
liability to investigators? 
8. Will a process assist in identifying how many DT groups or individuals 
are present within the United States? 
9. Will this process result in assisting in LE budget enhancements if 
groups/individuals are identified in their area of responsibility (national 
and local)? 
10. Will a validation process assist in developing new legislation in targeting 
the modus operandi of DT groups (e.g., Animal Enterprise Terrorism 
Act)? 
11. Would a validation process clearly define DT groups and individuals 
thereby alleviate the fear of legitimate groups having their constitutionally 
protected rights infringed upon? 
12. If a DT designation process was developed how should it be 
implemented? 
13. Would the identification of a group as a DT organization bring undo 
attention to those of like mind but are demonstrating legally? 
14. Is the FBI the appropriate agency to develop a validation and designation 
process? (If not who would you suggest?) 
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15. Would designation cause significant economic hardship (stigma associated 
with being a target) to those companies and universities targeted by a 
terrorist? 
16. Will a process force groups to go underground making it even harder to 
identify criminal membership? 
17. Will a process result in over collection by LE purely because they are 
associated with being a group? 
18. Will companies targeted have difficulty in obtaining loans, insurance, etc.? 
Will those that do have to pay a premium for these services? 
19. Will it further make it difficult to differentiate between those that are 
legitimate and those that aren't within a group? 
20. Would the process put a chilling effect on those who lawfully and legally 
support a cause? 
21. Would a process develop unforeseen issues by designating one group with 
a particular ideology and the government does not designate another group 
with the same ideology? 
22. Will a process be able to assist with groups whose names change but 
membership stays the same? For example, if you have a group name 
Suspect #1 and you have them identified as a DT group, then they go out 
two months later and commit acts in the name of Suspect #2. 
23. Would the process assist in recognizing groups that are founded on a 
legitimate and lawful foundation, but has a rogue wing? How do you name 
a one-third of a group a terrorist group and two-thirds a legitimate group?
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APPENDIX B. DESIGNATION LISTS 




















U.S. Non U.S. 
FTO  X NO YES X  YES X   X 
SST  X NO YES X  YES X   X 
TEL  X NO YES X  YES X   X 
SDN  X NO YES X  YES X   X 
CTWL (2) X  YES YES (Classified)  X YES X X X X 





VGTOF/Gang X  YES YES  X YES (1) N/A N/A X X 
TIDE  X YES YES  X YES X  X X 
DTO (3)            
Sex Offender  X NO YES X  YES N/A N/A X X 
Gang Injunction X  YES YES X  YES  X X X 
CalGang X  YES YES  X YES (1) N/A N/A X X 
 
*(1) 28 CFR Part 23 Compliant 
*(2) Consolidated Terrorist Watch List 
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